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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE EFFECTS OF POST-RECALL FEEDBACK: EXAMINING  
WITNESS RECALL QUANTITY, ACCURACY, AND CONFIDENCE 
by 
Dana Hirn Mueller 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Nadja Schreiber Compo, Major Professor 
Most eyewitness identification protocols recommend withholding feedback after an 
identification has been made, at least until a measure of confidence can be gathered. 
Although much research has examined the impact of post-identification feedback on 
subsequent witness behavior and confidence, research addressing the importance of post-
recall feedback remains largely incomplete. The current study examined the effects of 
post-recall feedback and question type on subsequent witness recall, confidence, and 
reports of view of the crime. In line with previous eyewitness identification research, it 
was predicted that participants receiving confirming post-recall feedback would be more 
confident in their prior recall compared to participants receiving neutral, no, or 
disconfirming feedback. One hundred and fifty-eight participants viewed a mock crime 
video of a robbery followed by an interview which included both open-ended and cued 
questions. Participants were then given either confirming, neutral, no, or disconfirming 
feedback and asked about their confidence and the clarity of their view of the perpetrator. 
Under the pretense that the recording equipment failed, participants were interviewed 
again using the same question format. The second interview was followed by a series of
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suggestive questions. After the second interview, participants were again asked about 
their confidence and self-reported quality of view of the perpetrator. Participant 
interviews were transcribed and scored for quantity, accuracy, and consistency by two 
blind, independent coders. Analyses revealed that feedback had a systematic impact on 
confidence such that participants who received confirming feedback were more confident 
in the overall accuracy of their prior memory accounts than those who received neutral, 
no, or disconfirming feedback and participants who received neutral or no feedback were 
more confident in the overall accuracy of their prior memory accounts compared to those 
in the disconfirming feedback condition. In line with previous eyewitness identification 
research, there was no significant relationship between recall accuracy and reported 
confidence. Results from the current study can be used to inform real-world investigative 
interviewers by highlighting the consequences of offering post-recall feedback. 
Specifically, feedback can impact witness confidence irrespective of actual recall 
accuracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are on your way home from work and decide to stop at an ATM 
to complete a transaction. While you are standing in line, a man emerges from behind a 
corner, pulls out a gun, and demands money from a woman in front of you. After 
threatening your safety as well as the safety of others in line, the robber grabs money 
from the woman in front of you and flees. Police are summoned and arrive on location. 
While still trying to regain your composure from this disturbing situation, a police officer 
begins to interview you. After you have given your statement, the officer shakes his head 
and responds, “Some of the information you have given me doesn’t match the other 
evidence we have.” Given his response, how likely might you be to change the 
information and level of detail you offer in a subsequent interview either at the station 
and/or in court? How will his feedback affect your confidence in the information you 
recalled? Conversely, imagine that the officer told you that the information you gave 
matches other information he has. How might that confirming feedback influence your 
subsequent recall and confidence?     
Thousands of law enforcement professionals conduct investigative interviews 
with witnesses of crimes each day. As these interviews often play a central role in 
criminal investigations (Kebbell & Milne, 1998), it is critical that they are conducted 
using methods which will not only gather accurate information at the time of the 
interview, but preserve witness memory for subsequent interviews and statements made 
at trial. As a consequence of the increasing number of exonerations decided on the basis 
of fallacious information given by witnesses, much justified attention has been paid to 
system variables (i.e., features of the investigative process under the control of the justice 
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system) in general and the procedures surrounding lineup identifications in particular 
(Wells, 1978; Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & 
Brimacombe, 1998). Erroneous eyewitness memory during lineups has been listed as a 
contributing factor in approximately 75% of DNA exoneration cases (Innocence Project, 
n.d.; Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000). Given these miscarriages of justice, legal 
psychology researchers have put particular effort toward addressing ways to increase the 
quantity and quality of information gathered from witnesses with the overarching goal of 
ensuring that the person who committed the crime(s) is convicted and that anyone 
factually innocent of the crime(s) is not convicted.   
One system variable which has received considerable research attention in the 
context of eyewitness identifications is post-identification feedback provided by the 
investigator after a witness has picked a target from a lineup (Wells & Bradfield, 1998; 
1999). Post-identification feedback is defined as any information about an identification 
choice given to witnesses after they have identified an individual from a lineup 
(Neuschatz et al., 2007). For example, saying to a witness after s/he has chosen a member 
of a lineup: “Great job! We were hoping you’d pick him!”  
Numerous studies have demonstrated that post-identification feedback can 
influence subsequent witness confidence as well as other self-reported measures of view 
of the crime including ease of making an identification and the quality of view the 
witness had of the perpetrator (Douglass & Steblay, 2006; Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 
2014). Given the importance of witness statements in criminal investigations and at trial, 
especially when a witness is confident (Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Brewer & Burke, 2002; 
Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981), it is surprising that similar attention has not been 
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paid to examining the possible impact(s) of post-recall feedback. In the context of the 
current study, post-recall feedback is defined as any feedback provided by the interviewer 
to the witness after the witness has recalled a critical event. The gaps in post-recall 
feedback research are critical given that virtually any witness making an identification is 
likely to have also been interviewed by investigators. Several obvious deficits exist 
within the investigative interviewing literature as the impact of post-recall feedback on 
subsequent witness recall, confidence, and reports of the quality of view of a critical 
incident is largely unexplored. One important starting point for addressing these gaps in 
research is to consult the wide body of literature which explores and outlines the 
relationship between feedback given after a lineup choice and the subsequent confidence 
in that choice.  
Post-Identification Feedback and Confidence: Theoretical Perspectives  
Research examining the impact of post-identification feedback demonstrates that 
confirming post-identification feedback increases eyewitness confidence, the level of 
attention reportedly paid to the critical event, the reported amount of time the perpetrator 
was visible to the witness, and the reported ease of an identification (Douglass & Steblay, 
2006; Steblay et al., 2014). One potential explanation for the substantial impact of post-
identification feedback is hindsight bias or the “knew-it-all-along” phenomenon 
(Fischhoff, 1977). Hindsight bias is the tendency to find the outcome of an event more 
predictable after the outcome has already been established. Thus, offering confirming 
feedback to a witness who has just identified a suspect may lead the witness to believe 
that, because the outcome is now known and confirmed, it was easier to identify the 
suspect than it really was.  
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Self-perception framework. A second theoretical way in which the effects of 
post-identification feedback can be interpreted is through Bem’s (1967; 1972) self-
perception theory. Self-perception theory posits that when the internal cues to interpreting 
our own behavior and/or motives are ambiguous, we use external cues such as our actual 
behavior to help interpret those cues (Bem, 1967; 1972). For example, if witnesses are 
unsure of their memory of a perpetrator but then choose a member of a lineup, witnesses 
may infer that they must have a good memory of the perpetrator because they picked a 
member of a lineup. Self-perception theory has been supported, for example, by research 
suggesting that manipulating facial expression can influence mood (Laird, 1974; Strack, 
Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Here, participants were asked to either hold a pen in their 
mouth in such a way that it forced those participants to smile or maintain a facial 
expression that inhibits smiling. All participants were then asked to watch and rate 
various videos (e.g., cartoons). Participants who were forced to smile subsequently rated 
cartoons as being funnier than participants who were not able to smile (Laird, 1974; 
Strack et al., 1988).  
In the context of post-recall feedback, the self-perception framework would 
predict that witnesses who report information about a critical event will use their own 
behavioral cues (i.e., recalling information about a crime) to glean a feeling of confidence 
about that recall. In other words, witnesses may recall a target event and use that behavior 
to conclude that, because they have recalled information about the critical event, they 
must have a strong memory of that event. However, despite the insight the self-
perception perspective offers, a direct theoretical framework which has been used to 
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explain why post-identification feedback can influence confidence and reports of quality 
of view is the cue-accessibility framework (Wells & Bradfield, 1998).  
Cue-accessibility framework. The cue-accessibility framework states that 
witnesses do not form an impression of an incident while the incident is occurring, which 
is a key difference between self-perception theory and the cue-accessibility framework. 
Instead, witnesses form an impression of their confidence after a choice has been made 
(e.g., selection of a lineup member) using various cues (e.g., a lineup administrator 
saying, “Great! You identified the suspect!”) (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002; Charman, 
Carlucci, Vallano, & Hyman Gregory, 2010; Hastie & Park, 1986; Steblay et al., 2014).  
The cue-accessibility framework was developed and tested by Wells and 
Bradfield (1998) who asked participants to watch grainy security camera footage of a 
perpetrator committing a real crime. Participants were then shown a target-absent lineup. 
After an identification was made, participants were either given confirming, 
disconfirming, or no feedback. Participants given confirming feedback were told, 
‘“Good. You identified the actual suspect in the case,”’ participants given disconfirming 
feedback were told, ‘“Oh, you identified number ___. The actual suspect is number 
___,”’and participants in the control condition were not given any feedback (Wells & 
Bradfield, 1998, p. 363). Results showed that participants given confirming feedback not 
only reported being more certain of the choice they had made, but in their confidence and 
reports of view of the perpetrator compared to participants given no or disconfirming 
feedback. Disconfirming feedback was shown to have a deleterious effect on confidence, 
but not to the same extent that confirming feedback had on elevating witness confidence. 
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Similar studies of post-identification feedback have expanded the original 
framework and findings by using elderly participants and comparing the impact of 
confirming post-identification feedback to that of the frequently used college-age sample 
(Neuschatz et al., 2005). Consistent with the findings of previous research, age did not 
have an impact on confidence of participants who were given confirming post-
identification feedback (Neuschatz et al., 2005). That is, both elderly and college-aged 
participants expressed similarly high confidence after being given confirming post-
identification feedback compared to both elderly and college-aged participants who were 
given no post-identification feedback. Similar results were found after a one week delay 
in a second study (Neuschatz et al., 2005), in contrast to other research demonstrating 
that elderly persons are more vulnerable to suggestion compared to young adults (Karpel, 
Hoyer, & Toglia, 2001). Neuschatz and colleagues aruged that these findings also support 
the cue-accessibility framework as participants who were given confirming feedback 
could deduce that they must have had a clear view of the perpetrator and were confident 
in their identification after they received confirming post-identification feedback. 
The cue-accessibility framework further postulates that witnesses are unable to 
use the actual recall of their identification experiences independently of subsequent 
feedback, and as such, are unable to make confidence assessments “online” (Wells & 
Bradfield, 1998, pp. 362). Thus, witnesses are typically unaware of the effect that post-
identification feedback has on confidence, as evidenced by the finding that those who 
were unaware of its impact were influenced just as much as participant witnesses who 
admitted that feedback may have impacted their confidence and ease of identification 
(Wells & Bradfield, 1998). People may display a lack of awareness because they are 
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often poor at introspection and are unaware of their underlying cognitive processes 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002).  
There are, however, some limitations to the cue-accessibility framework. First, it 
does not account for the possibility of external cues not being incorporated into 
confidence assessment (Charman et al., 2010). For example, an external cue (e.g., “You 
identified the suspect!”) may not be considered credible by the witness (e.g., if the 
witness is suspicious of the motives of the investigator for offering confirming feedback) 
and would thus not be included in the confidence assessment of the witness. Indeed, 
ulterior motives of the lineup administrator have been found to mitigate the inflating 
effects of confirming post-identification feedback (Neuschatz et al., 2007). Specifically, 
Neuschatz and colleagues (2007) asked participants to view a lineup and then gave half 
of participants confirming feedback while the other half received no feedback. Among 
the half of participants who received confirming feedback, researchers then created 
suspicion as to the motives of the lineup administrator for offering confirming feedback. 
Results showed that suspicious participants did not experience the same confidence 
inflation as to participants who were not suspicious. Second, the cue-accessibility 
framework does not provide an explanation as to why certain post-identification feedback 
instructions, such as asking the witness to consider the motives of the administrator, are 
effective in eliminating the effects of post-identification feedback (Charman et al., 2010). 
Selective cue integration framework. Building upon and addressing some of the 
limitations of the cue-accessibility framework (e.g., credibility evaluation of an external 
cue), the selective cue integration framework (SCIF) was developed to explain how 
witnesses may assess their own confidence after choosing a member in a lineup 
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(Charman et al., 2010). The SCIF proposes a three-stage process (Appendix A). First, 
when witnesses try to assess their confidence about a decision, they will first attempt to 
assess internal cues (i.e., how confident they feel about the lineup choice). During the 
first stage (assessment), if internal cues are strong (e.g., witnesses believe they have a 
good memory of the perpetrator and thus picked the correct person in the lineup), 
witnesses will make a confidence judgment using these internal cues. However, the 
weaker the internal cues, the more inclined witnesses will be to search for external cues 
to determine their own confidence, which leads witnesses to the second stage.  
In the second stage (search), witnesses seek and either incorporate or disregard 
external cues depending on the extent to which those cues support preexisting beliefs. 
Specifically, if the external cue is confirming, witnesses will accept that cue, but if the 
external cue is disconfirming, witnesses will be less likely to accept that cue. Acceptance 
of confirming cues can be explained by our desire to see ourselves as competent and 
accurate in our decisions (Blanton, Pelham, DeHart, & Carvallo, 2001). We also tend to 
be motivated to readily accept confirming information while closely examining 
disconfirming information in an attempt to disregard that information (Lord, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1979). Thus, if the external cue is confirming, witnesses will incorporate that cue 
and move on to the third stage (evaluation). However, if the cue is disconfirming, 
witnesses will not move on to the evaluation stage. If witnesses do not move on to the 
evaluation stage on the basis of one cue, they will move on to looking for other external 
cues to assess their confidence. 
Upon entering the third stage (evaluation), witnesses evaluate the credibility of 
the external cue and if there is no information available which undermines the credibility 
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of the cue, that cue will be used by witnesses to assess their confidence. In other words, if 
witnesses do not see the source of the cue as unreliable, that cue will be incorporated into 
their confidence assessment. For example, if witnesses receive confirming feedback from 
a police officer involved in the case and there is no evidence witnesses have which would 
undermine the credibility of that investigator and/or the feedback s/he is offering, 
witnesses will generally consider the investigator to be credible. As a result, witnesses 
will likely incorporate the information from that source into their confidence judgment. It 
is important to note that the acceptance of the cue does not hinge on witnesses searching 
for information which bolsters the credibility of the cue. Rather, only if there is no 
information to indicate unreliability of the cue, will the cue be accepted. The prediction 
for the acceptance of the cue is based on our tendency to judge a cue by the credibility of 
the source rather than the content of the cue (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). If 
the feedback is perceived to be unreliable, witnesses will likely look for other information 
to determine confidence in their decision.  
Application of the SCIF to post-recall feedback. Taken together, the SCIF can 
help provide a theoretical framework to explain how post-identification feedback can 
affect confidence judgments. Applied to the context of post-recall feedback, the SCIF 
would predict that when witnesses are asked about their confidence and reports of view 
after being provided with feedback about a statement, they will begin by assessing their 
internal cues. If the internal cues are strong, they will make a confidence judgment using 
those internal cues. However, if internal cues are weak, they will begin to search for 
external cues, such as feedback from the interviewer. If the incoming cue (post-recall 
feedback) is confirming, witnesses will accept that cue and move on to the third stage 
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(evaluation). However, if the cue is disconfirming, witnesses will search for other cues to 
form a confidence judgment.  
If witnesses have moved on to the third stage, witnesses will evaluate the 
credibility of the external cue. If there is no information available which undermines the 
cue, then witnesses will incorporate the post-recall feedback into their confidence 
assessment. However, if there is information available that discredits the cue, that cue 
will not be incorporated into their confidence assessment. In the case of post-recall 
feedback, a piece of potentially discrediting information could be the perception that the 
investigator has no knowledge of the crime. Thus, the investigator offering post-recall 
feedback could be seen as uninformed and unqualified to offer accurate post-recall 
feedback.  
Taken together, providing witnesses with post-identification and post-recall 
feedback may be problematic for three chief reasons. First, providing confirming 
feedback to witnesses may inflate their confidence, regardless of the accuracy of the 
information provided by the witness. Similarly, giving witnesses disconfirming feedback 
after their statements may deflate their confidence irrespective of statement veracity. 
Although the SCIF suggests that witnesses are likely to disregard external cues that are 
not confirming, disconfirming feedback after a lineup identification has been shown to 
have a deleterious impact on witness confidence (Douglas & Steblay, 2006; Steblay et al., 
2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998), even if it is not as impactful as the effect of confirming 
feedback on confidence (Douglas & Steblay, 2006). In other words, although witness 
confidence is expected to increase more as a result of confirming feedback than witness 
confidence decreases as a result of disconfirming feedback, (Douglas & Steblay, 2006; 
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Steblay et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998), both are expected to have an effect (to 
varying degrees).  
Although the SCIF contends that disconfirming feedback will not have a 
deleterious impact on confidence, Charman et al. (2010) is the only study to date 
supporting that prediction. Further, the SCIF has only been examined in the context of 
feedback for an identification, which is a single piece of information given by the 
witness. However, during an investigative interview, witnesses are almost certainly 
offering multiple pieces of information potentially increasing the likelihood of feedback 
and thus error compared to an identification. As a result, confidence may be increasingly 
malleable. Thus, both confirming and disconfirming feedback may be more impactful to 
confidence in the accuracy of a recall opportunity compared to confidence in the 
accuracy of an identification.  
Further, providing disconfirming feedback may leave witnesses particularly 
vulnerable to the introduction of subsequent suggestive information - an interviewing 
pattern unique to and relevant in witness interviewing contexts compared to 
identifications. Examining the impact of interviewing techniques is critical given that 
poor patterns of interviewing are sometimes found in real-world investigative interviews 
(Schreiber Compo, Hyman Gregory, & Fisher, 2012). That is, if witnesses who are given 
disconfirming feedback believe that an investigator has information about a case that 
exceeds their recall and that the investigator is a credible source, witnesses may be more 
likely to acquiesce to subsequent suggestions made by the investigator compared to 
witnesses offered confirming or no feedback. In addition to theoretical foundations for 
the impact of post-identification feedback, it is critical to examine the relationship 
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between the confidence of witnesses in their selection of a lineup and the actual accuracy 
of that identification. 
The Confidence-Accuracy Correlation 
 The confidence-accuracy correlation can be defined as the relationship between 
the mean confidence witnesses have in the accuracy of their choice during a lineup 
identification task (predicted performance) and the accuracy of their identification (actual 
performance) (Wells et al., 1998). Researchers have conducted a multitude of studies 
failing to show a significant, reliable relationship between confidence and accuracy 
which may indicate that confidence is not diagnostic of accuracy (Wells et al., 1998). In 
other words, the confidence of witnesses in their identifications has not reliably been 
shown to correlate with the accuracy of their identifications. Although many researchers 
have not demonstrated a reliable, significant relationship between confidence and 
accuracy (Wells & Murray, 1984), there may be some evidence of a confidence-accuracy 
correlation.  
For example, using a sample of 35 studies, Bothwell, Deffenbacher, and Brigham 
(1987) found a significant moderate relationship between the confidence witnesses had in 
their identification and the actual accuracy of their lineup choice. Results revealed a 
moderate correlation between confidence and accuracy (r = .25). Further, the most recent 
meta-analysis examining studies assessing the confidence-accuracy correlation found a 
moderate relationship between confidence and accuracy (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 
1995). Specifically, Sporer and colleagues used a sample of 30 studies and found a 
significant moderate correlation between confidence and accuracy (r = .29). 
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There may be several explanations for varying and/or moderated research findings 
on the relationship between confidence and accuracy in lineup research including varied 
witness viewing conditions (Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, 1998) and the way in which 
confidence and accuracy are calculated (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Weber & Brewer, 2003) 
and assessed (e.g., verbally versus numerically). However, given that the current study is 
one of the first to examine post-recall feedback and the relationship between post-
feedback recall and accuracy, potential moderators between confidence and accuracy 
were not explored. Rather, the current study focused primarily on the impact of feedback 
on accuracy and quantity of information elicited during recall. 
Feedback and Investigative Interviewing 
Despite the potential impact of post-recall feedback, few studies to date have 
examined the effects of feedback in the investigative interviewing arena. In two such 
studies, participants watched a nonviolent video clip and were interviewed using a series 
of open-ended and cued questions. Participants were then given either neutral feedback 
(“Thank you for answering these questions. To ensure that we have recorded your 
answers correctly, we’ll run through the questions once more.”) or negative feedback 
(“From my records here I see that others we‘ve asked about this have done better than 
you. I’d like you to try again, to see if you can do better.”) (McMurtrie, Baxter, 
Obonsawin, & Hunter, 2012a; 2012b, pp. 960; 593). McMurtrie and colleagues (2012a) 
found that participants were more likely to change their original responses on a 
subsequent recall opportunity when given disconfirming feedback compared to 
participants who were given neutral feedback. Further, McMurtrie et al. (2012b) 
postulated that participants receiving disconfirming feedback may have had heightened 
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anxiety which may have led to a change in a subsequent recall opportunity as a function 
of disconfirming feedback.  
Despite the development of these studies, there were several areas that were left 
unexplored. First, neither study examined the possible effects of confirming or no 
feedback, which may help disentangle the respective effects of positive versus negative 
approaches to providing witnesses with feedback. The authors also did not examine the 
effects of feedback on witness resistance or vulnerability to suggestion. Further, source 
monitoring was not measured to determine a possible impact of feedback on witnesses’ 
subsequent ability to differentiate between memory sources. Researchers also did not ask 
participants for reports of quality of view (e.g., how clearly the witness saw the 
perpetrator) to parallel findings on post-identification feedback and to assess any possible 
effects of feedback on retrospective evaluations of witnessing conditions. Finally, these 
studies did not examine whether question format played a role in the effect of feedback 
on subsequent recall. That is, if a possible effect of post-recall feedback on subsequent 
recall depends on recall format (e.g., open-ended vs. cued).      
Post-recall feedback has also been examined using the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott-Read-Solso (DRMRS) paradigm coupled with the implementation of 
confirming, disconfirming, or no feedback (Pirmoradi & McKelvie, 2014). To examine 
the effect of post-recall feedback on witness confidence and post-feedback recall, 
participants were first asked to memorize three word lists. Participants were then asked to 
write their confidence in the accuracy of each word recalled and then give an overall 
confidence rating for each list. Participants were then given either confirming, 
disconfirming, or no feedback on the accuracy of their previous recall. After feedback, 
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participants were asked about their confidence in the overall recall accuracy of all three 
word lists. Lastly, participants were asked to remember an additional six word lists. 
Results revealed that participants who received disconfirming feedback were 
significantly less confident in the accuracy of their previously recalled word lists than 
participants who received confirming or no feedback. Data further revealed that memory 
performance for subsequent word lists did not differ as a function of feedback. 
One primary difference between the Pirmoradi and McKelvie (2014) study and 
typical post-identification feedback paradigms is that both specific and general measures 
of confidence were taken before feedback was given rather than after. Thinking about the 
accuracy of one’s response(s) before receiving feedback has been shown to protect 
against inflated post-feedback confidence (Wells & Bradfield, 1999). Known as the 
feedback prophylactic effect, it may account for the lack of difference typically found 
between the reported confidence of participants given confirming feedback compared to 
participants given no or disconfirming feedback. Thus, the current study will further 
address remaining gaps in the literature by exploring the effects of post-recall feedback 
on confidence without asking participants to consider their pre-feedback confidence.  
Rapport Building and Witness Recall  
A potential way to explain how post-recall feedback may affect witnesses’ 
subsequent recall is via the effect(s) it may have on the relationship between interviewer 
and witness. As such, providing witnesses with confirming feedback after a recall attempt 
could be considered an instance of rapport building. While there is no consistently 
agreed-upon definition of rapport (Hall, Roter, Blanch, & Frankel, 2009; Vallano & 
Schreiber Compo, 2015), rapport in an investigative interview setting may best be 
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defined as a “harmonious, sympathetic connection to another” (Newberry & Stubbs, 
1990, p. 14).  
Some research supports the use of rapport building, demonstrating that witnesses 
who are exposed to rapport building tend to recall more accurate information compared 
to those not given rapport (Collins, Lincoln, & Frank, 2002). Rapport has also been found 
to decrease inaccuracy (Vallano & Schreiber Compo, 2011) and to increase the recall of 
accurate information if built before misinformation has been introduced (Kieckhaefer, 
Schreiber Compo, & Vallano, 2014). Vallano and Schreiber Compo (2011) have also 
found that witnesses who were exposed to rapport gave a higher rate of accurate 
information and were more resistant to the introduction of misinformation than 
participants who received no rapport. 
Building rapport is recommended in several best practice guidelines including the 
Cognitive Interview (CI) (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), the National Institute of Justice 
Eyewitness Evidence Guide for Law Enforcement (Technical Working Group for 
Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; 2003), and the NICHD Investigative Interviewing Protocol 
(Orbach, Hershkowitz, Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2000). Rapport building is 
also recommended as part of the PEACE model for investigative interviewing (Home 
Office, 2002) as well as the PRICE model recommended for use by Scottish law 
enforcement professionals (Memon, 2009). Although the use of rapport is widely 
recommended, the ways in which rapport can and should be established vary somewhat 
between recommendations. 
Feedback and rapport. Although guidelines and researchers differ in how they 
define and operationalize rapport, they agree that in order to establish rapport, interviewer 
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and witness must have a friendly, supportive, and respectful relationship. As such, 
providing feedback to witnesses could be considered an instance of rapport. It may be 
that in addition to building rapport with witnesses as suggested by the CI and other 
interviewing guidelines, rapport can be established in other ways or, at the very least, the 
perception of rapport may be introduced. In other words, offering a witness confirming 
feedback (e.g., “Great, a lot of the information you gave me matches what I already 
had.”) or even neutral feedback (e.g., “Thank you for coming in today and giving me 
your statement.”) could be interpreted as rapport by a witness. Conversely, offering 
disconfirming feedback (e.g., “Some of the information you gave does not match the 
information I have.”) may be considered an instance of negative rapport.  
It has been suggested that one way positive rapport can affect witness recall is via 
a reduction of cognitive load (Kieckhaefer et al., 2014). Research on cognitive load 
borrows from the well-established finding that people have finite cognitive resources 
when acting as processors and generators of information (Baddeley, 1986; Kahneman, 
1970; 1973). Arguably, when attempting to reproduce an accurate and plentiful 
recollection of a crime during an interview, cognitive demands of witnesses are 
increased. Witnesses may be engaging in monitoring their behavior as well as the 
behavior of the interviewer for feedback and engaging in the demanding process of 
generating retrieval cues, all of which have the potential to increase cognitive load 
(Kieckhaefer et al., 2014). As such, an interviewer who builds rapport with witnesses 
may help to reduce or eliminate cognitive load. Building rapport could also help reduce 
or eliminate excessive pressure that witnesses may feel to be helpful, which may reduce 
witnesses’ monitoring of their behavior as well as the behavior of the interviewer. In light 
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of the emerging research on the effects of rapport on witness recall, it is important to 
explore whether offering confirming feedback to witnesses can facilitate subsequent 
recall by reducing cognitive load. It will also be important to assess whether offering 
disconfirming feedback inhibits recall by increasing cognitive load. To determine the 
potential effects of feedback on cognitive load, a measure of perceived cognitive load 
was included in the current study. 
Offering disconfirming feedback, in turn, may increase cognitive load which 
could be detrimental to recall. Specifically, it may increase cognitive load by prompting 
witnesses to monitor the interviewer more closely for additional cues to their perceived 
accuracy. Witnesses may also demonstrate increases in cognitive load after disconfirming 
feedback by testing additional ways to be helpful and produce information. Witnesses 
may then devote additional cognitive resources to monitor the interviewer for any 
feedback which may cue them to the “correct” response to give.  
Further, providing witnesses with confirming post-recall feedback may have the 
potential to be beneficial if the information gathered from witnesses is highly accurate. If 
witnesses recall a significant number of accurate pieces of information during an 
interview after which confirming feedback is given, those same pieces of information 
may have an increased chance of being recalled during a subsequent interview. Thus, the 
more accurate the initial witness statement, the more beneficial confirming feedback may 
be on subsequent recall. However, confirming feedback may also increase the likelihood 
with which a piece of inaccurate information will be recalled again. As such, it is 
particularly critical for investigators using confirming feedback to maximize the 
opportunity to obtain accurate information initially while simultaneously reducing the 
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likelihood of gathering inaccurate information. One of the most important ways to ensure 
the elicitation of accurate information in conjunction with post-recall feedback would be 
the use of best practice investigative interviewing techniques and the avoidance of 
problematic techniques. 
Investigative Interview Question Format 
The current study examined the effects of post-recall feedback on information 
recalled using different recall formats. A myriad of studies have demonstrated the effects 
of question format on recall quantity and accuracy (e.g., Hammond, Wagstaff, & Cole, 
2006; Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Memon & Vartoukian, 
1996), confirming that open-ended question formats consistently yield a higher quantity 
of accurate witness information than closed or suggestive question formats. As such, a 
thorough examination of the post-recall feedback effect should account for different 
question formats documented in real-world interviewing (Fisher, Geiselman, & 
Raymond, 1987; Schreiber Compo et al., 2012). 
Open-ended questions. A considerable amount of research has allowed for 
evidence-based recommendations of investigative interviewing techniques (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992; Orbach et al., 2000; Powell, Fisher, & Wright, 2005; Technical 
Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; 2003). One of the central techniques 
recommended across best practice guidelines is the use of open-ended questions. Open-
ended questions can be defined as questions which allow for a free narrative or 
unstructured response from a witness (e.g., “Tell me everything you can remember about 
the person who robbed the convenience store.”).  
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The benefits of asking open-ended questions are threefold. First, allowing 
witnesses to give a free narrative allows witnesses to disclose information in the way it is 
represented in their memory. For example, witness A may recall information about a 
critical event in chronological order while witness B discloses information according to 
what s/he feels is most important. Asking witness B a question about what happened 
chronologically (e.g., “Tell me everything that happened first. What happened after 
that?”) may inhibit the recall of witness B. Second, asking open-ended questions may 
help to encourage active witness participation by allowing the witness to be vocal 
throughout the interview. Third, Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) suggest that giving 
witnesses an option to withhold an unsure response will decrease overall inaccuracy of 
recall. That is, if a participant is asked to recall a fact of which he or she is unsure, not 
forcing that participant to respond will lead to an increase in accurate responses 
compared to inaccurate responses. These findings were further confirmed by Evans and 
Fisher (2011) who found that participants who were given an option to withhold 
information about which they were unsure recalled more accurately overall compared to 
participants who were not explicitly given that option. A potential explanation for the 
reduction in inaccuracy is that when people are given the opportunity for a free narrative, 
they are better able to accurately monitor their own knowledge in conjunction with 
choosing their own output criterion. Thus, witnesses may choose to offer only 
information they believe to be correct and because they are encouraged to answer the 
question in an open-ended format, they are able to choose which information to offer and 
which information to withhold.  
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In sum, open-ended questions offer a variety of benefits to witnesses and 
investigators and generally allow for witnesses to maximize accurate recall.  However, 
although open-ended questions are a staple of best practice investigative interviewing, 
cued questions can and do serve a purpose to help elicit specific information from 
witnesses.   
Cued questions. To gather highly detailed and specific information, the use of 
cued questions can be helpful in an investigative interview by gathering information not 
obtained via open-ended questions (Powell & Thomson, 1996). Question format (open-
ended vs. cued) has been studied more frequently with children than adults, but the 
mechanisms which allow cued questions to be helpful for children arguably also hold true 
for adults. As opposed to open-ended questions, cued questions are asked with the 
intention of eliciting a specific piece of information. Cued questions are used frequently 
in real-world investigative interviews (Schreiber Compo et al., 2012), forensic interviews 
with children, and are often conceptualized as “Wh” questions (e.g., Who, What, When, 
etc.) during these interviews (Miles, Powell, Gignac, & Thomson, 2007, p. 218).  
Cued questions can help witnesses recall specific pieces of information more 
effectively than open-ended questions as cued questions provide information contained in 
the question that will cue witnesses to information that they may not have been able to 
retrieve during a free narrative (Dent & Stephenson, 1979). In other words, cued 
questions can act as a retrieval cue for information that would not have been recalled by 
free recall alone. However, as noted by Evans and Fisher (2011), cued recall questions 
may be unhelpful as these questions both force witnesses to respond and do not allow 
witnesses to control the specificity or precision of the information being offered. Thus, 
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cued questions should be used minimally, but may sometimes be able to help elicit 
important, specific details not mentioned by witnesses during a previous free narrative. In 
addition to excessively relying on cued questions, there are various problematic 
investigative interviewing techniques which should be assiduously avoided by 
interviewers.  
Misinformation and Suggestibility  
The factors conducive and detrimental to witness memory have been studied by 
legal psychology researchers for decades, due to both their theoretical and applied 
significance (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010; Steblay, 
1992; 1997; Wells et al., 1998). There are a variety of interviewing techniques and other 
investigative risk factors which can render witnesses vulnerable to falsely recalling 
information such as the introduction of misinformation after a critical event has occurred. 
The misinformation effect has typically been described as introducing incorrect 
information about an original event to witnesses which alters accuracy of the memory for 
the original event (e.g., Ayers & Reder, 1998; Loftus & Palmer, 1974).   
Given that memory is a reconstructive process, the introduction of misinformation 
- particularly through the use of suggestive questions - during the process of 
reconstruction can substantially alter subsequent witness recall (Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, 
1975; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). Suggestive questions can be defined as questions that 
introduce new information into the interview and suggest to witnesses the answer that 
interviewers expect. For example, if a witness has not yet described the clothing of a thief 
and the interviewer asks, “Was the perpetrator wearing a red shirt?”, that question 
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introduces information (color of the shirt) that was not yet disclosed and suggests to the 
witness the answer the interviewer expects.   
A plethora of research has documented that the introduction of misinformation via 
suggestive questions can alter both the witness statement about and memory for an event 
(Loftus, 1975; Loftus and Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975). Over time, several 
theoretical mechanisms for the misinformation effect have been proposed. Originally, 
Loftus (1975) proposed the trace overwrite hypothesis. The trace overwrite hypothesis 
suggests that the original memory for an event could actually be overwritten by the new 
(misinformation) and therefore the new memory (misinformation) would be recalled in a 
subsequent recall attempt. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) challenged the overwriting 
hypothesis via a cleverly designed series of experiments which suggested that 
participants were simply conceding to what they believed were the demand 
characteristics of the recall situation. That is, participants were able to perceive the 
responses experimenters expected and responded to meet the expectations of the 
experimenter. 
Feedback and suggestibility. Estimating the possible effects of post-recall 
feedback can also be informed by the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) 
(Gudjonsson, 1984). According to the interrogative suggestibility model as measured by 
the GSS, negative feedback has been suggested as being potentially impactful in affecting 
the likelihood of a suspect confessing during an interrogation (Gudjonsson & Clark, 
1986). To examine interrogative suggestibility, Gudjonsson and Clark (1986) constructed 
a model to help predict the outcome of an interrogation. One of the elements of the 
interrogative suggestibility model included interrogative pressure, which is described as 
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any influence applied by the interrogator which may interfere with the accuracy of 
information given by the suspect. A primary way to apply interrogative pressure is by 
giving negative feedback (Baxter, Charles, Martin, & McGroarty, 2012). Within the 
context of the GSS, feedback is conceptualized as a message to the interviewee from an 
interrogator with the primarily goal of strengthening or modifying the response of the 
suspect (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986). 
Suspects may perceive negative feedback during an interrogation as being 
unsupportive on the part of the interviewer (Bain & Baxter, 2000) and, as such, may 
result in an increase in anxiety and a reduction in self-esteem (Gudjonsson & Clark, 
1986). In an attempt to decrease anxiety, people may look to the interrogator for approval 
and cues which suggest whether a question has been answered satisfactorily (Gudjonsson, 
1988). According to interrogative suggestibility model, the use of negative feedback may 
increase compliance and suggestibility (McMurtrie et al., 2012b). Applied to the witness 
context, the model would predict that participants who are given negative feedback 
would be less confident in subsequent recall opportunities and more vulnerable to the 
introduction of misinformation via suggestive questions.  
Source Monitoring 
More recently, the source monitoring framework allowed for the inclusion and 
explanation of both the trace overwrite hypothesis and demand characteristic work by 
McClosky and Zaragoza (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Specifically, the 
source monitoring framework provides a more encompassing explanation for the 
misinformation effect, where both sources, the original information and the 
misinformation co-exist and are chosen via attributional processes. As such, source 
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monitoring can be defined as the process involved in making attributions about the 
source(s) of our knowledge and memory (Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998; Johnson et 
al., 1993), which can be internal (i.e., something stored in our memory) or external (i.e., 
information given by an interviewer). According to the source monitoring framework, the 
misinformation effect can occur when a witness incorrectly attributes a piece of 
misinformation to their own memory instead of an outside source (e.g., a suggestive 
interviewer). The source monitoring framework has been successfully used to explain 
suggestibility and misinformation effects in witness recall scenarios given the nature of 
the to-be-remembered material and the potential for outside information (or 
misinformation) that may be presented (Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003).  
Because witnessing a crime can be very complex, the potential for source 
confusion introduced through suggestion and outside (mis)information is high (Belli & 
Loftus, 1994; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). Given the well-researched impact of source 
monitoring errors on memory and recall (Johnson et al., 1993), the way(s) in which post-
recall feedback can affect subsequent recall attempts and witness source monitoring 
abilities is important to understand. Source monitoring can be a complex process 
including both heuristic judgments and a systematic reflection of the source of one’s 
knowledge (Johnson, DeLeonardis, Hashtroudi, & Ferguson, 1995). As such, there may 
be a variety of ways in which source monitoring abilities may be interrupted (Johnson et 
al., 1993; Johnson et al., 1995). One of the ways source monitoring processes may be 
disrupted is that information about an event is not simply retrieved, but also combined 
with information from external cues present at the time of retrieval (Tulving, 1983) which 
may lead to errors if such cues are incorrect. Within the context of feedback during an 
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investigative interview, offering disconfirming feedback to witnesses may disrupt their 
subsequent source monitoring decision making such that ease, vividness, and salience of 
recall may no longer be used as indicators of an external source of that memory. 
Conversely, if witnesses are given information suggesting that their recall is accurate, a 
lack of ease, vividness, and salience of recall may also no longer be used as indicators 
that a specific memory has not been externally generated.  
Despite research-based recommendations, many real-world interviewers continue 
to use closed or suggestive questions when interviewing witnesses (Schreiber Compo et 
al., 2012). As feedback may manipulate the confidence of witnesses regardless of the 
accuracy of their recall for an event, it is particularly important to examine those question 
types most vulnerable to outside influence. The current study therefore included open-
ended, cued, and suggestive questions to test for any possible interactions between post-
recall feedback and question format.   
Current Study 
The present research is the first to address the effects of confirming, neutral, no, 
and disconfirming post-recall feedback and question format on subsequent witness recall 
accuracy, quantity, suggestibility, confidence, and self-reported ratings of quality of 
view. Specifically, the study had four  primary goals: (1) examine the effects of 
confirming, neutral, no, or disconfirming post-recall feedback on subsequent eyewitness 
recall, confidence, and reports of view of the crime; (2) examine the effects of different 
types of feedback on witnesses’ subsequent suggestibility to misinformation; (3) examine 
possible interactions between post-recall feedback and open-ended versus cued question 
format on witness recall, confidence, and reports of view of a crime; (4) assess the impact 
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of feedback on the accuracy of witness source monitoring. In sum, the overarching goal 
of the current research is to examine what type(s) of feedback and question format would 
be detrimental or possibly helpful in eliciting a higher quantity of accurate witness 
information under subsequent varying recall conditions. 
Contribution to the literature. The current study addresses a variety of novel 
areas which previous research has not yet explored. There are seven ways in which the 
current research contributes to remaining gaps in the literature focusing on the impact of 
post-recall feedback on witness memory and confidence. First, the current study 
examined underlying theoretical approaches that could potentially explain the impact of 
post-recall feedback on witness recall and self-reported measures of view. The current 
research used both measures of rapport and reported cognitive load to examine the ways 
in which varying types of feedback could affect rapport and cognitive load, which may be 
linked to recall quantity and accuracy.  
Second, the current study was the first to examine the impact of post-recall 
feedback on subsequent reports of confidence and other reports of view of a critical 
event. Pirmoradi and Stuart McKelvie (2014) examined post-recall feedback, but asked 
for measures of confidence before feedback was given. Asking participants for measures 
of confidence before they are given feedback has been shown to assuage the impact of 
confirming feedback on subsequent confidence (Wells & Bradfield, 1999).  
Third, the current research was the first to examine a possible interaction between 
feedback and question format. That is, to date, no research has examined how feedback 
interacts with witness recall in response to open-ended and cued questions. The potential 
interaction between question type and feedback is critical given that best practice 
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research-based guidelines tend to encourage the use of open-ended questions and cued 
questions are often used by real-world interviewers. In sum, law enforcement 
investigators are likely to use both open-ended and cued questions.  
Further, no research has been conducted to disentangle possible effects of neutral 
feedback versus no feedback. Eyewitness identification literature typically uses a “no” 
feedback condition as a control group without examining whether neutral feedback (i.e., 
feedback about the recall of a witness without commenting on accuracy) is different from 
no feedback. Fifth, the current study was the first to examine the potential impact of 
feedback on witness suggestibility. Witness suggestibility as a function of feedback is of 
particular concern as confident witnesses are typically seen as more credible, but 
confidence may be rendered undiagnostic via suggestion.  
Also, the current study examined the impact of post-recall feedback on source 
monitoring accuracy as well as confidence in source monitoring accuracy. It was 
important to continue exploring the possible ways in which feedback may enhance or 
interrupt source monitoring processes. Lastly, the current research was the first to gather 
a comprehensive inventory of the impact of post-recall feedback not only on witness 
confidence, but on the reported length of view of the perpetrator, clarity of view of the 
perpetrator, ease of recall during the interviews, level of attention paid to the perpetrator, 
and perception of recall accuracy. 
Hypotheses 
There were a total of four hypotheses, each of which corresponds to the primary 
goals of the current study. Each hypothesis will discuss the predicted outcomes for the 
current study as well as the literature which supports each prediction.  
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Hypothesis one. The first hypothesis predicted that feedback would affect 
quantity and accuracy of witness information provided at a subsequent recall attempt 
such that participants receiving confirming feedback would report more accurately and 
more extensively than participants who received no, neutral, or disconfirming feedback 
and participants receiving no or neutral feedback would report more accurately and more 
extensively than participants who received disconfirming feedback. Past research has 
focused almost exclusively on the negative impact of post-identification feedback. 
However, given the differences between recalling information during an investigative 
interview and identifying a perpetrator in a lineup, there may be situations in which 
feedback may help build rapport and thus actually be beneficial.  
Providing confirming feedback may decrease cognitive load during a subsequent 
recall attempt, and thus allow for a more thorough memory search. A decrease in 
cognitive load would be particularly beneficial if the information provided during the first 
recall attempt was accurate, particularly given the perceived credibility of confident 
witnesses in the criminal justice system (Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Brewer & Burke, 
2002). Neutral and no feedback are not expected to significantly increase or decrease 
cognitive load. However, there may be a marginal difference between participants who 
are given neutral feedback and participants given no feedback considering that the neutral 
feedback condition could be perceived as an instance of rapport building, and participants 
in the no feedback condition would likely not have the same experience.  
Finally, providing disconfirming feedback was predicted to render a witness less 
resistant to the subsequent introduction of misinformation and more inaccurate in their 
source monitoring decisions. For example, if witnesses have been told that they have 
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provided incorrect information during an initial memory test (e.g., an investigative 
interview) and those witnesses are later introduced to misinformation (e.g., through the 
use of suggestive questions), those witnesses may rely more on the misinformation given 
by the interviewer because the witnesses believe that their source monitoring decision 
making has been compromised.  
Hypothesis two. The second hypothesis predicted that participants receiving 
confirming post-recall feedback would have the highest confidence in both accurate and 
inaccurate information recalled compared to participants receiving no, neutral or 
disconfirming feedback, and that participants receiving no or neutral feedback would 
have higher confidence ratings compared to participants receiving disconfirming 
feedback. Offering confirming feedback to participant witnesses has consistently been 
shown to increase confidence (Wells & Bradfield, 1998; 1999).  
The increase in confidence after confirming feedback is given may be partially the 
result of hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1977) and has also been explained by the SCIF 
(Charman et al., 2010). Specifically, if witnesses receive confirming feedback from a 
credible source, witnesses will be more likely to incorporate that feedback when making 
a judgment of their confidence. Although disconfirming feedback had not been shown to 
have a “symmetrical” deleterious effect on confidence compared to confirming feedback, 
research suggests that disconfirming feedback can be detrimental to witness confidence 
(Douglas & Steblay, 2006; Steblay et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998). It was also 
predicted that confirming feedback would have a bolstering effect on the length of time 
participants reported viewing the perpetrator, their reported ease of recall, their attention 
paid to the perpetrator, and their perception of accuracy of their recall compared to 
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participants receiving neutral, no, and disconfirming feedback and that participants given 
neutral feedback were predicted to report better views of the perpetrator and perceive 
their recall as more accurate compared to participants given disconfirming feedback. 
Hypothesis three. The third hypothesis predicted that open-ended questions 
would elicit the greatest accuracy and quantity of information compared to cued 
questions. Open-ended questions are considered a staple of best practice investigative 
interviewing and are consistently recommended in various best practice interviewing 
methods (e.g., Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Orbach et al., 2000; Powell et al., 2005; 
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; 2003).  
Open-ended questions allow witnesses to use and adjust their own output criterion 
and to recall information in the way it is represented in their memory as well as 
facilitating active witness participation. Cued questions are potentially valuable in 
eliciting specific information not previously retrieved during a free recall opportunity 
without introducing misinformation. It was thus predicted that cued questions would 
elicit a lower quantity of accurate information than open-ended questions, but more 
accurate and plentiful information than suggestive questions, as the latter have been 
consistently shown to be detrimental to witness recall especially when they introduce 
misinformation, given that memory is a reconstructive process (Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, 
1975; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). 
Hypothesis four. Lastly, feedback and question type were predicted to interact 
such that participants receiving confirming feedback would be less vulnerable to 
suggestive questions than participants receiving no or neutral feedback, and participants 
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receiving no or neutral feedback would be less vulnerable to suggestive questions than 
participants receiving disconfirming feedback. Offering confirming feedback to witnesses 
may improve subsequent recall and resistance to suggestive questions given that 
confirming feedback may decrease a witnesses’ cognitive load. Conversely, witnesses 
receiving disconfirming feedback may be at increased risk of falsely acquiescing to 
suggestive questions. Witnesses receiving no or neutral feedback were predicted to be 
unaffected in their subsequent recall. 
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II. METHOD 
Participants                                                                                                                                                   
Participants were 158 undergraduate students recruited from a large public 
university in the Southeastern US. The sample size of 158 was determined by a power 
analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007) and was found to be 
sufficient to detect small to medium group differences at p < .05 and an experimental 
power of .95. The sample gathered was primarily female (78.1%, 21.9% male) and 
Hispanic (65.6%, 16.6% African American, 8.6% Caucasian, 2.6% Asian, and 6.6% 
reported as “other”). The mean age of participants was 21.66 (SD = 4.24) with a range of 
18 to 43 years. Participants were recruited using three methods: 1) posting flyers around 
both major Florida International University campuses, 2) making announcements in 
undergraduate classes notifying students of the opportunity to participate, and 3) use of 
Florida International University’s SONA participant recruitment system which advertises 
research participation studies across classes. All participants were given course credit for 
participation. 
Design  
The study adhered to a 4 (post-recall feedback: confirming v. neutral v. no v. 
disconfirming) x 2 (question type: open ended v. cued) mixed-factorial design with 
repeated measures on the last factor.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants arrived individually at a laboratory room and were asked to provide 
consent to participate and to be video- and audio-recorded. Participants who consented 
were then instructed how to play a video file of a mock crime video on a computer 
34 
 
screen. The experimenter told the participant that they were being given instructions on 
how to proceed because the experimenter would be leaving them alone in the room while 
they watched the video. Before leaving the room, the experimenter told the participant 
that s/he had never watched the DVD.  
The mock crime DVD has been successfully used in prior research (Kieckhaefer, 
2014), was 2 minutes and 26 seconds long, and depicted a video-recorded realistic 
convenience store armed robbery (Appendix B). The crime was filmed from a “point of 
view” perspective. That is, when watching the DVD, it appears as if the participant was 
watching from the viewpoint of someone who was actually walking into a convenience 
store and witnessing the robbery. The mock crime depicted three witnesses including a 
female customer, a male customer, a female cashier, and a male robber.  
The video first featured the cashier who was a 20-year-old Hispanic female with 
brown eyes and long black hair worn straight down behind her shoulders and fastened 
with a bow on the left side of her head. She wore a pink cardigan over a white shirt, dark 
skirt, and glasses with black frames. Throughout the video, the cashier looked at and 
pressed buttons on her phone and shifted her weight from foot to foot. After focusing on 
the cashier for three seconds, the camera shifted to a 19-year-old Caucasian female 
customer who entered the store carrying a small black and white puppy. She was wearing 
a light blue t-shirt, light grey shorts, a multi-colored purse across her body, glasses, and 
sandals.  
After entering, the female customer walked to the back of the store, picked up an 
energy drink in a large green can, walked to the front of the store, paid with cash, and 
exited the store. As the female customer approached the cashier, the male customer 
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entered the store. The male customer was a 23-year-old Hispanic male with short black 
hair and brown eyes. He was wearing glasses with black frames, a brown collared shirt, 
blue jeans, and black boots. After entering, the male customer walked to the back of the 
store and took a red Gatorade out of a refrigerator. He then moved to the last aisle in the 
store where he began looking at granola bars. While the male customer examined the 
granola bars, the perpetrator entered the store. The perpetrator was a 23-year-old 
Hispanic male with short black hair and light facial hair. He had brown eyes and was 
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, a green shirt underneath the sweatshirt, dark blue 
jeans, and dark blue tennis shoes. 
After the perpetrator entered the store, he took off his sunglasses, put them in his 
sweatshirt pocket, and then zipped up his hooded sweatshirt. He then walked to an open 
refrigerated case where he picked up a purple Naked brand smoothie. The perpetrator 
then circled through the store, approached the cashier and asked, “Do you have any 
cigarettes?” The cashier replied, “No, sorry,” and the perpetrator then pulled out a toy 
black 9mm gun and pointed it at the cashier. The perpetrator then yelled, “Give me all 
your money!” and turned to the male witness and said, “Hey you, get over there, hands 
up!” As the perpetrator was ordering the male witness to come to the front of the store, 
the cashier produced a black bag from behind the counter and put money from the 
register into the bag. As the cashier filled the bag with money, the perpetrator yelled, 
“Let’s go, let’s go! I don’t got all day, let’s go!” The cashier then handed the perpetrator 
the bag and he quickly ran out of the store while yelling, “I don’t want no funny 
business!”  
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After the participant finished watching the video, the experimenter re-entered the 
room. To make sure experimenters did not re-enter the room before participants finished 
watching the video, they were given stop watches timed to the length of the video. Once 
the experimenter re-entered the room, participants were given a distraction task to 
prevent ceiling effects of accuracy on cued-questions. The use of the distraction task was 
dictated by the results of a pilot study (N = 30). Given that an accuracy rate of .75 might 
not have allowed for the examination of meaningful differences between participant 
recall from cued questions as a function of feedback, a ten minute distraction task was 
given. 
The distractor task was a series of number connection puzzles (see Appendix C 
for a sample of a number connection puzzle). Participants were told, “You will now be 
given a cognitive ability task. You will have ten minutes to complete as many of the 
puzzles as possible. You have ten minutes beginning now.” Experimenters used a stop 
watch to ensure that all participants worked on completing the puzzles for exactly ten 
minutes. After participants worked on the distractor task for ten minutes, the 
experimenter proceeded with the first interview. 
During the first interview, the experimenter interviewed the participant using a set 
of four open-ended questions (Appendix D). Participants were first asked, “Tell me 
everything you can remember about what you just witnessed,” and were then given three 
follow-up questions in random order: 1) “Tell me everything you can remember about the 
perpetrator,” 2) Tell me everything you can remember about the location of the crime,” 
and 3) “Tell me everything you can remember about any witnesses.” These questions 
were followed by the final question: “Is there anything else you can remember?” To 
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ensure exhaustive recall, the last question was repeated until participants explicitly stated 
that they could not remember anything else.  
After participants explicitly stated that they could not remember anything else, 
they were asked a series of 18 cued questions in random order (Appendix E). For 
example, participants were asked, “What color were the frames of the glasses the cashier 
was wearing?”, “What was the race of the perpetrator?”, and “What was the first thing 
the perpetrator touched in the store?” Similar to real-world investigative interviews, these 
questions were aimed at eliciting specific details of the mock-crime that may have not 
been reported during free recall. These questions were followed by the final question: “Is 
there anything else you can remember?” which was repeated by the interviewer until 
participants explicitly stated that they could not remember anything else.  
Upon completion of the first witness interview, the interviewer provided 
participants with feedback (confirming, neutral, disconfirming, or none) according to 
their pre-assigned, randomly selected feedback condition. The specific operationalization 
of the feedback was chosen to avoid giving any clues about the source of the 
interviewer’s information and to avoid giving information about the credibility or 
authority of the interviewer, which could have possibly confounded the effects of post-
recall feedback. That is, the use of general rather than specific feedback was employed to 
maximize experimental control over the type of feedback in light of varying witness 
reports. Regardless of what type of information the participant recalled, the feedback 
universally applied and did not have to be tailored to the information given by any 
participant. Further, the four feedback conditions were designed in such a way that the 
experimenter was speaking for approximately the same length of time. Research 
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assistants were trained to provide feedback in a casual, conversational manner without 
sounding rehearsed.  
Participants who received confirming feedback were told by the experimenter, 
“Although I haven’t watched the video, I’ve been given information about the video from 
the experimenters in charge of the study and the information you’ve given me seems to 
be accurate.” Conversely, participants given disconfirming feedback were told, 
“Although I haven’t watched the video, I’ve been given information about the video from 
the experimenters in charge of the study and the information you’ve given me seems to 
be inaccurate.” Participants in the neutral feedback condition were told: “Thank you for 
your statement. I appreciate you taking the time to provide the information that you did. I 
think I have everything I need for now.” Lastly, participants receiving no feedback were 
told: “Let me just check the time before we continue. I want to make sure that we’re 
staying on track and that I collect all the information I need to. The experimenters are 
strict with the procedure.” The current design included both neutral and no feedback in 
order to explore the potential for participants to interpret neutral feedback as rapport 
building that can potentially impact subsequent information given by witnesses.  
After feedback was given, participants were asked to give verbal ratings of the 
perceived accuracy of their overall statement, the confidence in the accuracy of their 
recall, attention paid to the perpetrator, quality of view of the perpetrator, length of time 
they were able to see the perpetrator, and the ease with which they recalled information 
during the interview (Appendix F). To help each participant conceptualize the 7-point 
Likert-type scale on which level of attention paid to the perpetrator, quality of view of the 
perpetrator, confidence in recall accuracy, ease of recall, and perception of recall 
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accuracy were measured, the experimenter gave the participant a laminated form listing a 
7-point Likert-type scale with no labels for specific measures (Appendix G). After these 
ratings, the experimenter told participants that there were a few more questions s/he 
needed to ask before the study could be completed. The experimenter then casually 
looked over at the camera, began to look concerned, started examining the camera, and 
told the participant that it appeared the camera had malfunctioned and had not been 
recording for the duration of the interview (although it had in fact recorded). The 
experimenter then explained that because the camera had not been recording, s/he needed 
to re-interview the participant as well as re-collect reports of confidence, attention, 
qualify of view, length of time the perpetrator was seen, and ease of recall. The deception 
allowed the experimenter to subsequently conduct a second interview in an identical 
format without revealing the true purpose of the study or arousing suspicion from the 
participant. The interviewer then conducted the second interview. 
 For Interview 2, participants were asked the same open-ended and cued questions 
given during Interview 1 as well as a new series of 20 suggestive questions which 
introduced misinformation through modification (Appendix H). One half of the questions 
were accurate-leading and the other half was incorrect-leading which was counter-
balanced across participants. For example, “Did the robber have any facial hair?” was an 
accurate-leading question given that the perpetrator had facial hair whereas, “Was the 
robber clean shaven?” was an inaccurate-leading question. 
Once Interview 2 was completed, participants were again asked to give verbal 
reports of confidence, perception of overall recall accuracy, attention to the perpetrator, 
quality of view, ease of recall, and the amount of time they saw the perpetrator, but as it 
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related to the second interview. The experimenter explained that s/he was going to collect 
the data again just to make sure it was recorded by the camera. Asking for a second set of 
self-report measures about the second recall opportunity allowed for a test of any possible 
changes in the self-report data that may occur as a function of feedback. After the self-
report data was collected, participants were asked to complete a source monitoring 
questionnaire that included a set of 20 source monitoring questions presented in random 
order (Appendix I). Each source monitoring question reflected the items included in each 
of the suggestive-leading questions. For each source monitoring item, participants were 
first asked to answer a cued question (e.g., “What color was the gun?”) before being 
asked about source of the information provided. For each item, participants were asked 
whether they remembered the information from the interviewer only, the video only, both 
the interviewer and the video, or if the source was unknown. If participants responded, 
“don’t know” to the cued source monitoring items, they were not asked about the source 
of the information given that the information was not known. Participants were asked 
both about their confidence in the accuracy of their responses to the cued questions and in 
the confidence in their ability to correctly identify the source of the information. Source 
monitoring confidence was collected on a 7-point Likert-type scale with “1” being “Not 
at all confident” and “7” being “Extremely confident.” 
After completing the source monitoring questionnaire, participants were provided 
with a rapport questionnaire to assess whether post-recall feedback affected witnesses’ 
perceptions of rapport with the interviewer (Appendix J). Participants were also given a 
questionnaire to examine their cognitive load (Kieckhaefer, 2014) which helped address 
the theoretical question of whether feedback impacts perceived cognitive load during a 
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subsequent recall opportunity (Appendix K). Lastly, suspicion was assessed (Appendix 
L). Specifically, participants were asked what the experimenter said during the 
interviews, whether they believed that the experimenter did not see the video, and 
whether there was deception involved in the study and, if so, in what way(s) (see 
Appendix M for overall study design). 
Interview Coding 
All witness interview audio recordings collected from participants were 
transcribed. Each interview transcript was then coded by two independent scorers.  Both 
scorers who were blind to participants’ conditions and extensively trained in using a 
detailed set of scoring rules. After thorough training of coding procedures was completed 
by each scorer, interview transcripts were coded by each scorer independently. A primary 
scorer coded all participant interviews and the co-scorer independently coded 50 (31.6%) 
of the transcribed interviews to establish inter-rater reliability. Intra-class correlations 
revealed high inter-rater reliability for all dependent variables assessed from the 
interviews. Specifically, intra-class correlations ranged from .93 to .99.  
Outcome Variables 
For scoring purposes, open-ended and cued witness portions of each interview 
transcript were divided into units of information. A unit was defined as the smallest piece 
of information that could assist in investigating a crime. That is, in the current study, 
units were considered “meaningful” parts of a sentence. 
By segmenting recall into individual units, coders were able to evaluate each unit 
for accuracy individually. For example, if the robber was described as a Caucasian male, 
“Caucasian” and “male” were divided into two separate units and assessed separately. 
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Quantity of information was assessed both via a word count for each section and by 
adding up the number of units per interview transcript. Each unit was then scored as 
accurate, inaccurate, “don’t know,” subjective, repeated, or a not scorable answer.  
A unit was scored as accurate if it depicted an accurate reflection of what was 
presented in the video and scored as inaccurate if it represented an inaccurate reflection 
(either modification or addition/confabulation) of what was depicted. A response was 
recorded as a “don’t know” unit if a participant indicated that he or she did not know the 
answer. A unit was classified as subjective if a participant offered a response that was an 
opinion of the participant that could not be verified for accuracy (e.g., “I thought the 
perpetrator was extremely attractive!”). A response was scored as a repeated unit if it had 
already been mentioned at any previous point in time during the interview. Scoring for 
repeated units during an interview included both open-ended and cued questions. For 
example, if a participant stated that the female customer was Caucasian in response to the 
first open-ended question and then stated again that the female customer was Caucasian 
in response to a subsequent cued question in the same interview, this was classified as a 
repeated unit. A not scorable answer was defined as a response by a participant that was 
irrelevant to the recall of the mock crime video. For example, if the participant stated, “I 
think it’s cold in here” or “I am feeling really tired,” these were considered not scorable 
units. 
Percent accuracy was computed by adding up the number of accurate units 
reported and dividing them by the total number of accurate, inaccurate, and “don’t know” 
units. Subjective and not scorable data were not included as part of that analysis. Percent 
inaccuracy was computed by adding up the number of inaccurate units and dividing those 
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by the total number of accurate, inaccurate, and “don’t know” units. Percent of “don’t 
know” units were assessed by dividing the number of “don’t know” units by the number 
of accurate, inaccurate, and “don’t know” units. Percent of repeated units was computed 
by dividing the total number of “repeated units” by the total number of reported units 
(accurate, inaccurate, “don’t know,” repeated, and subjective). Percent of subjective units 
was computed by adding up the total number of subjective and dividing each category of 
units by the total number of reported units.  
Answers to suggestive questions were scored according to a detailed answer key. 
If the response from the participant was accurate, it was either classified as 1) a correct 
acquiescence or 2) a correct rejection of interviewer’s suggestion. If the response was 
inaccurate, it was either classified as 1) an incorrect acquiescence which is agreeing with 
the interviewer’s incorrect suggestive question or 2) an incorrect rejection which is 
disagreeing with correct information suggested by the interviewer. Rate of correct 
acquiescences was computed by adding up the number of correct acquiescence responses 
and dividing that by the number of total number of responses gathered via suggestive 
questions. Rate of correct rejections was computed by adding up the number of correct 
rejections and dividing that by the number of total responses gathered by suggestive 
questions. Rate of incorrect acquiescences was analyzed by dividing the total number of 
incorrect acquiescence responses and dividing that by the total number of responses 
elicited via suggestive questions. Rate of incorrect rejections was computed by adding up 
the number of incorrect rejection responses and dividing that by the total number of 
responses elicited via suggestive questions. 
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Inconsistencies between the interviews were established by first comparing each 
detail reported in Interview 1 with that same detail in Interview 2. For example, if during 
Interview 1 a participant claimed that the perpetrator had facial hair, but in Interview 2 
claimed the perpetrator was clean shaven, this was considered inconsistent. 
Inconsistencies within interviews were not examined. Type of inconsistency was also 
documented. Specifically, scorers kept track of the type of inconsistency between 
Interview 1 and Interview 2:  from accurate to inaccurate, from inaccurate to accurate, or 
from inaccurate to inaccurate. An example of the type of inconsistency classified as 
accurate to inaccurate would be if, during Interview 1, a participant accurately recalled 
the perpetrator was a Hispanic male, but during Interview 2 recalls the perpetrator was a 
Caucasian male. An inconsistency from inaccurate to accurate was classified as such if a 
participant incorrectly recalled that there were five witnesses in the convenience store at 
the time of the robbery, but during Interview 2 the witness accurately recalled that there 
were two witnesses. An inaccurate to inaccurate inconsistency was scored if, during 
Interview 1, a participant recalled that the perpetrator was an African American male 
(inaccurate) and in Interview 2 recalled that the perpetrator was Caucasian (inaccurate).  
Reminiscence was also measured by documenting information that was recalled in 
Interview 2 but not recalled during Interview 1. Reminiscent information was also scored 
for accuracy. Forgotten information and the accuracy of forgotten information were also 
scored. Specifically, forgotten information was classified as such if a participant recalled 
information in Interview 1 and did not recall that information during Interview 2. 
Uncertain units were also assessed and put into two categories: 1) uncertain accurate or 
2) uncertain inaccurate. An uncertain accurate unit was classified as such if participants 
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indicated that they were not sure if an answer, but offered an accurate answer anyway. 
For example, if a participant stated, “I’m not sure, but I think the robber was Hispanic,” 
this was classified as an uncertain accurate unit. Conversely, if a participant stated, “I 
don’t know, but I think the robber was African American,” this was classified as 
uncertain inaccurate. 
Length of time participants reported viewing the perpetrator was measured in 
number of seconds. Quality of view the participant reported having of the perpetrator 
was verbally reported by the participant on a 7-point Likert-type scale with “1” being 
“Extremely poor” and “7” being “Extremely clear.” Level of attention the participant 
reportedly paid to the perpetrator was verbally reported by the participant on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale with “1” being “Extremely low” and “7” being “Extremely high.” The 
reported confidence in recall accuracy was verbally reported by the participant on a 7-
point Likert-type scale with “1” being “Extremely not confident” and “7” being 
“Extremely confident.” The reported ease of recalling the information was verbally 
reported by the participant on a 7-point Likert-type scale with “1” being “Not at all easy” 
and “7” being “Extremely easy.” Perception of recall accuracy was verbally reported by 
the participant on 7-point Likert-type scale with “1” being “Extremely inaccurate” and 
“7” being “Extremely accurate” (see Appendix F for the script experimenters used to 
collect the self-reported measures). 
Lastly, source monitoring responses were analyzed to assess whether participants 
correctly or incorrectly attributed a piece of information coming from: 1) the crime video 
only, 2) the interviewer only, 3) both the crime video and the interviewer, or 4) or an 
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uncertain source. Participants were also asked about their confidence in identifying a 
source on a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (extremely confident).  
Correct source monitoring attributions were classified and counted as a unit of 
information whose source was correctly identified. For example, if the crime video was 
the only source of information conveying that the perpetrator kept the gun in his the back 
of his pants and the participant identified the crime video as being the source of the 
information, this was considered a correct source monitoring attribution. Answers were 
classified as incorrect source monitoring attributions if a participant misattributed the 
source of a piece of information. For example, if the interviewer was the only source of 
information suggesting that the perpetrator was Caucasian, but the participant indicated 
the crime video as the source of the information, this was classified as an incorrect source 
monitoring attribution. The proportion of correct source monitoring attributions was 
computed as the total number of items assigned to the correct source out of all source 
monitoring items and the proportion of incorrect source monitoring attributions was 
computed as the total number of items assigned to the incorrect source out of all source 
monitoring items. 
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III. Results 
Impact of Post-Recall Feedback on Witness Confidence and Reports of View 
First assessment. To examine the possible impact of feedback on the first 
assessment of witness confidence and reports of view of the perpetrator, a one-way 
MANOVA was conducted. The independent variable in the current analysis was the type 
of feedback given to the participant (confirming v. neutral v. none v. disconfirming) and 
the dependent variables were the first assessment of the length of time the participant 
reported viewing the perpetrator, the clarity of view the participant reported having of the 
perpetrator, the level of attention the participant reportedly paid to the perpetrator, the 
reported confidence in prior recall accuracy, the reported ease of recalling the 
information, and the perception of recall accuracy (see Table 1 for means and standard 
deviations of reports of view of the perpetrator, reported confidence, reported ease of 
recall, and perceived accuracy of recall by feedback condition). 
The one-way MANOVA revealed a statistically significant overall difference 
across feedback conditions, F(3, 155) = 3.28, p < .001, η2p = .134. Specifically, feedback 
had a statistically significant effect on the reported clarity of view of the perpetrator, F(3, 
155) = 4.98, p = .003, η2p = .102. Post hoc Tukey tests revealed that participants given 
confirming feedback reported a significantly clearer view of the perpetrator than 
participants given disconfirming feedback (p = .002).  
The MANOVA also revealed a significant difference between feedback 
conditions for participants’ reported confidence in recall accuracy, F(3, 155) = 10.89, p < 
.001, η2p = .198. A subsequent Tukey analysis revealed that participants given confirming 
feedback were more confident in the accuracy of their prior recall compared to 
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participants given neutral feedback (p = .037), participants given confirming feedback 
were more confident compared to participants given no feedback (p = .043), participants 
given confirming feedback were more confident compared to participants given 
disconfirming feedback (p < .001), participants given neutral feedback were more 
confident compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p = .031), and 
participants given no feedback were more confident compared to participants given 
disconfirming feedback (p = .015). There was no significant difference in reported 
confidence between participants who received neutral feedback and those who received 
no feedback (p = .998). 
The MANOVA further revealed a significant difference between feedback 
conditions for participants’ reported ease of recall, F(3, 155) = 10.94, p < .001, η2p = 
.199. According to post hoc Tukey tests, participants given confirming feedback reported 
easier recall compared to participants given neutral feedback (p = .005), participants 
given confirming feedback reported easier recall compared to participants given no 
feedback (p = .003), and participants given confirming feedback reported easier recall 
compared to participants who received disconfirming feedback (p < .001). There were no 
other significant differences (all ps > .05). 
 The MANOVA further revealed a significant difference between feedback 
conditions for perceived recall accuracy, F(3, 155) = 14.01, p < .001, η2p = .242. Post hoc 
Tukey tests showed that participants given confirming feedback perceived their recall to 
be more accurate compared to participants given neutral feedback (p = .003), no feedback 
(p = .001), and disconfirming feedback (p < .001). Participants given neutral feedback 
perceived their recall to be more accurate compared to participants given disconfirming 
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feedback (p = .002), and participants given no feedback perceived their recall to be more 
accurate compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p = .002). There was no 
significant difference in perception of recall accuracy between participants given neutral 
and no feedback (p = .910). 
 There was no significant effect of feedback on length of time participants reported 
viewing the perpetrator, F(3, 155) = .945, p = .421, η2p = .021. There was also no 
significant effect of feedback on the level of attention participants reported paying to the 
perpetrator, F(3, 155) = .372, p = .773, η2p = .008. 
Table 1 
First assessment of mean reports of view of the perpetrator, reported confidence, 
reported ease of recall, and perceived accuracy of recall 
a Length of view was reported in number of seconds 
*Denotes significant effect at p < .05 
 
Second assessment. To examine the possible impact of feedback on the second 
assessment of witness confidence and reports of view of the perpetrator, after the second 
recall opportunity, a one-way MANOVA was again conducted. The independent variable  
was the type of feedback (confirming vs. disconfirming vs. neutral vs. no feedback) given 
to the participant and the dependent variables were the second round of assessments of 
length of time the participant reported viewing the perpetrator, the clarity of view the 
participant reported having of the perpetrator, the level of attention the participant 
 Feedback Received 
First Assessment Confirming Neutral None Disconfirming M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Length of viewa 48.10 65.54 31.77 29.64 37.91 35.29 47.70 41.46 
Quality of view 5.34* 1.26 4.60 1.16 5.00 1.19 4.23 1.45 
Attention 5.59 1.24 5.30 1.26 5.51 1.01 5.37 1.33 
Confidence 5.68* 1.13 4.83* 1.32 4.89* 1.39 3.90 1.40 
Ease of recall 5.34* 1.20 4.37 1.07 4.37 1.14 3.77 1.33 
Perceived accuracy 5.71* 0.90 4.83* 0.99 4.80* 1.32 3.87 1.50 
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reportedly paid to the perpetrator, the reported confidence in recall accuracy, the reported 
ease of recalling the information, and the perception of recall accuracy. It is important to 
note that the self-report data gathered during the second assessment applied only to 
Interview 2 as participants were specifically instructed to give these measures only as 
they applied to the second recall attempt (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations 
of reports of view of the perpetrator, reported confidence, reported ease of recall, and 
perceived accuracy of recall by feedback condition). 
The one-way MANOVA again revealed an overall effect of feedback, F(3, 155) = 
3.28, p < .001, η2p = .133. Specifically, there was an effect of feedback on the reported 
clarity of view of the perpetrator, F(3, 155) = 4.84, p = .003, η2p = .099. Post hoc Tukey 
analyses revealed that participants who received confirming feedback reported having a 
significantly clearer view of the perpetrator compared to participants who received 
disconfirming feedback (p = .003).  
The MANOVA also revealed a significant difference between feedback 
conditions for participants’ reported confidence in recall accuracy, F(3, 155) = 9.42, p < 
.001, η2p = .176. Subsequent Tukey tests revealed that participants given confirming 
feedback were more confident compared to participants given neutral feedback (p = 
.005), no feedback (p = .048), and compared to participants given disconfirming feedback 
(p < .001). Participants given no feedback were more confident compared to participants 
given disconfirming feedback (p = .049), with no additional difference in reported 
confidence between participants given neutral feedback and participants given no 
feedback (p = .823) and between participants given neutral and disconfirming feedback 
(p = .355). 
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The MANOVA further revealed a significant difference between feedback 
conditions for participant reported ease of recall, F(3, 155) = 7.73, p < .001, η2p = .149. 
Subsequent Tukey tests showed that participants given confirming feedback reported 
easier recall compared to participants given neutral feedback (p = .003), compared to 
participants given no feedback (p = .045), and  compared to participants who received 
disconfirming feedback (p < .001). There was no significant difference in reported ease 
of recall between participants given neutral feedback and participants given no or 
disconfirming feedback (p = .731 and p = .872, respectively), and no difference between 
participants given no and disconfirming feedback (p = .267). 
 As to perception of recall accuracy, the MANOVA further revealed a significant 
difference between feedback conditions for perceived second recall accuracy, F(3, 155) = 
15.6, p < .001, η2p = .261. Follow-up Tukey tests showed  that participants given 
confirming feedback perceived their recall to be more accurate compared to participants 
given neutral feedback (p = .005),  no feedback (p = .014), and compared to participants 
given disconfirming feedback (p < .001). Participants given neutral feedback perceived 
their recall to be more accurate compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p 
= .011), and participants given no feedback perceived their recall to be more accurate 
compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p = .002). There was no 
significant difference in perception of second recall accuracy between participants given 
neutral feedback and no feedback (p = .966). 
There was no significant effect of feedback on length of time participants reported 
viewing the perpetrator, F(3, 155) = 1.49, p = .221, η2p = .033, or on the level of attention 
participants reported paying to the perpetrator, F(3, 155) = 1.08, p = .360, η2p = .024.  
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Table 2 
Second assessment of mean reports of view of the perpetrator, reported confidence, 
reported ease of recall, and perceived accuracy of recall 
a Length of view was reported in number of seconds 
*Denotes significant effect at p < .05 
 
Differences between first and second assessment. To determine possible 
differences between the first assessment and second assessment in the length of time the 
participant reported viewing the perpetrator, the clarity of view the participant reported 
having of the perpetrator, the level of attention the participant reportedly paid to the 
perpetrator, the reported confidence in recall accuracy, the reported ease of recalling the 
information, and the perception of recall accuracy, a within-participants repeated 
measures MANOVA was conducted. Analyses revealed no differences between the first 
and second assessment for any of the self-reported measures, F(3, 155) = 0.46, p = .807, 
η2p = .003. That is, participants did not significantly change their confidence, their self-
reported measures of view of the perpetrator, or ease of recall from the first assessment of 
these measures to the second assessment of these measures. 
Impact of Question Type and Post-Recall Feedback on Witness Recall 
 
A mixed-measures MANOVA was used to test for interactions as well as main 
effects of question type and post-recall feedback on Interview 2 quantity and accuracy. 
The independent variables were the between-participants variable of feedback 
(confirming vs. neutral vs. no vs. disconfirming) and the within-participants variable of 
 Feedback Received 
First Assessment Confirming Neutral None Disconfirming M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Length of viewa 47.39 65.65 27.47 24.57 38.49 34.30 49.30 41.44 
Quality of view 5.39* 1.20 4.67 1.03 5.06 1.03 4.37 1.50 
Attention 5.63 1.02 5.17 1.18 5.46 1.17 5.27 1.39 
Confidence 5.59* 1.02 4.63 1.10 4.89* 1.23 4.13 1.36 
Ease of recall 5.29* 1.29 4.27 1.11 4.57 1.07 4.03 1.25 
Perceived accuracy 5.61* 1.02 4.70* 0.92 4.83* 1.07 3.80 1.40 
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question type (open-ended vs. cued). The dependent variables in the current analysis were 
the total number of accurate units recalled, the overall accuracy rate, the total number of 
inaccurate units recalled, the overall inaccuracy rate, the total number of “don’t know” 
units, number of repeated units, number of subjective responses, and number of not 
scorable responses. There was a significant main effect of question type on witness 
accuracy, F(3, 155) = 2.59, p = .033, η2p = 1.23. A subsequent Tukey test revealed that 
participants reported more accurate units of information when responding to open-ended 
questions compared to cued questions (p = .020). Further, participants’ accuracy rates 
were higher when responding to open-ended questions compared to cued questions (p = 
.045). There was also a significant main effect of question type on the quantity of witness 
recall, F(3, 155) = 1.91, p = .040, η2p = .923. A post hoc Tukey analysis showed that 
participants reported more overall units of information when responding to open-ended 
questions compared to cued questions (p = .034). However, there was no significant main 
effect of the type of feedback that was offered on any of the dependent variables, F(3, 
155) = .961, p = .415, η2p = .022. There was also no significant interaction between the 
type of feedback offered and the type of question used for any of the dependent variables, 
F(3, 155) = 1.09, p = .888, η2p = .024.  
Further, to examine the impact of question type on recall during Interview 1 (pre-
feedback), a one-way MANOVA was conducted which examined the total number of 
accurate units recalled, the overall accuracy rate, the total number of inaccurate units 
recalled, the overall inaccuracy rate, the total number of “don’t know” units, number of 
repeated units, number of subjective responses, and number of not scorable responses. 
The one-way MANOVA revealed a significant effect of question type on witness recall, 
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F(3, 155) = 1.85, p = .035, η2p = .888. Specifically, a post hoc Tukey analysis showed 
that participants reported more overall units of information when responding to open-
ended questions compared to cued questions (p = .035). 
Table 3 
Total number of units and mean percentages participants’ responses in Interview 2 by 
feedback and question type 
a % refers to the percentage of units divided by the total number of units 
b # refers to the number of units 
 
Impact of Feedback on Consistency and Uncertain Information 
To determine a possible effect of feedback type on consistency between Interview 
1 and Interview 2, a one-way MANOVA was conducted. The independent variable in this 
analysis was the type of feedback given and the dependent variables were the number of 
reminiscent units, forgotten units, uncertain units, and contradictions between witness 
recall at time 1 and time 2. There was no significant effect of feedback on any of these 
dependent variables, F(3, 155) = 1.82, p = .102, η2p = .088. 
Suggestive Questions 
To determine a possible effect of feedback type on responses to suggestive 
questions, a one-way MANOVA was conducted. The independent variable in the current 
 Confirming Neutral None Disconfirming 
Unit type Open Cued Open Cued Open Cued Open Cued 
Accurate %a 82.4 57.7 74.6 62.9 73.5 55.9 75.3 57.1 
Accurate #b 61 15 59 17 50 19 55 16 
Inaccurate % 13.5 26.9 19.0 29.6 17.6 29.4 17.8 32.1 
Inaccurate # 10 7 15 8 12 10 13 9 
Don’t know % 4.05 15.4 19.0 7.40 8.80 14.7 6.80 10.7 
Don’t know # 3 4 5 2 6 5 5 3 
Repeated # 21 5 19 8 18 2 16 4 
Subjective # 7 3 9 5 8 4 8 2 
Not scorable # 17 3 14 2 15 4 15 5 
Word count 980 100 899 113 950 109 871 102 
Total units 119 37 121 42 109 44 112 39 
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analysis was the type of feedback given to the participant and the dependent variables 
were correct acquiescence rate, incorrect acquiescence rate, correct rejection rate, 
incorrect rejection rate, and “don’t know” response rate. There was no significant effect 
of feedback on participant responses to suggestive questions, F(3, 155) = .922, p = .314, 
η2p = .033 (see Table 4 for responses to suggestive questions by condition). 
Table 4 
Mean number of correct acquiescences, correct rejections, incorrect acquiescences, and 
incorrect rejections 
Participant Response Feedback Received Mean Standard Deviation 
Correct Acquiescence 
Confirming 9.2 2.3 
Neutral 9.0 1.9 
None 9.3 2.5 
Disconfirming 8.9 2.0 
    
Correct Rejection 
Confirming 8.6 2.2 
Neutral 8.9 2.1 
None 9.1 2.5 
Disconfirming 8.9 1.8 
    
Incorrect Acquiescence 
Confirming 1.1 0.9 
Neutral 1.2 1.5 
None 1.1 0.8 
Disconfirming 1.3 1.2 
    
Incorrect Rejection 
Confirming 1.4 1.0 
Neutral 1.2 0.7 
None 1.4 0.7 
Disconfirming 1.3 1.1 
 
Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy 
 Pearson correlations were used to determine possible relationships between the 
first assessment of confidence in accuracy of recall and actual recall accuracy during 
Interview 1. There was no significant correlation found between the first measure of 
confidence and the accuracy of recall during Interview 1, r = 0.21, n = 158, p = .391. A 
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Pearson correlation was also used to examine the presence of a relationship between 
perceived accuracy and actual recall accuracy. There was no significant correlation 
between the first measure of perceived accuracy and the accuracy of recall during 
Interview 1, r = 0.25, n = 158, p = .154. 
 A Pearson correlation was also conducted to examine any potential relationship 
between the second assessment of confidence in accuracy of recall and actual recall 
accuracy during Interview 2. There was no significant correlation between the second 
measure of confidence and the accuracy of recall during Interview 2, r = 0.31, n = 158, p 
= .199. A Pearson correlation was also used to examine a possible relationship between 
perceived accuracy and actual recall accuracy yielding  no significant correlation between 
the first measure of perceived accuracy and the accuracy of recall during Interview 1, r = 
0.29, n = 158, p = .210. 
Source Monitoring Questionnaire  
Open-ended source monitoring questions. Recall that after answering the series 
of suggestive questions (e.g., “Was the gun black?”), participants completed the source 
monitoring questionnaire. This questionnaire began with an open-ended question (e.g., 
“What color was the gun?”) for each of the 20 source monitoring items. For each source 
monitoring item, participants were then asked to attribute the source to each of these 
initial open-ended source-monitoring questions. Therefore, both the accuracy of answers 
to the initial open-ended source monitoring questions (e.g., “What color was the gun?”), 
and the answers to the subsequent source-monitoring questions were assessed (“Where 
do you remember encountering this information?”).  
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Consequently, a one-way MANOVA was used to determine whether participants’ 
open-ended source monitoring responses were affected by the type of feedback 
previously given to participants. The independent variable in the current analysis was the 
type of feedback given to participants and the dependent variables were the rate of 
accurate responses, the rate of inaccurate responses, and the rate of “don’t know” 
responses to open-ended source monitoring questions. The one-way MANOVA revealed 
no significant impact of feedback on the accuracy of open-ended source monitoring 
questions, F(3, 155) = 0.59, p = .710, η2p = .008 (see Table 5 for means and standard 
deviations of response rates to open-ended source monitoring questions). 
Table 5 
Rates for percent accurate, inaccurate, and don’t know responses to open-ended source 
monitoring questions 
Response Rates to Open-Ended Source Monitoring Questions 
 Accurate Inaccurate Don’t Know 
Feedback Received M SD M SD M SD 
Confirming 0.65 0.16 0.20 0.29 0.15 0.18 
Neutral 0.61 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.10 0.15 
None 0.60 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.11 
Disconfirming 0.60 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.13 
 
Confidence in accuracy of open-ended source monitoring questions. To assess 
the impact of feedback on self-reported confidence for open-ended source monitoring 
recall accuracy, a one-way ANOVA was used. The independent variable was the type of 
feedback given to participants and the dependent variable was confidence in the accuracy 
of open-ended source monitoring recall. The analysis revealed that feedback had a 
significant effect on participant confidence in source monitoring accuracy recall, F(3, 
155) = 2.53, p = .03. The subsequent Tukey test revealed that participants given 
confirming feedback were significantly more confident in their open-ended source 
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monitoring recall accuracy compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p = 
.02). There were no other significant effects of feedback on source monitoring recall 
accuracy (see Table 6 for mean confidence in accuracy of open-ended source monitoring 
questions).   
Table 6 
Mean confidence ratings for open-ended source monitoring questions (1 = not at all 
confidence and 7 = extremely confident)  
 Confidence Rating 
 Accurate Inaccurate 
Feedback Received M SD M SD 
Confirming 5.55* 1.20 5.60* 1.55 
Neutral 4.93 1.71 4.66 1.91 
None 4.90 1.40 4.59 1.78 
Disconfirming 4.01 1.72 4.15 1.29 
*Denotes significant difference at p < .05 
Relationship between open-ended source monitoring recall accuracy and 
confidence. To examine a possible relationship between accuracy of responses to open-
ended source monitoring questions and confidence in accuracy of responses to open-
ended source monitoring questions, a Pearson correlation was computed. There was no 
significant correlation between source monitoring recall accuracy and confidence in 
source monitoring recall accuracy, r = 0.29, n = 158, p = .155.  
Source monitoring accuracy. The next set of analyses tested participants’ ability 
to identify the source (e.g., the mock crime video) of the information they recalled in 
response to the open-ended source monitoring recall questions (e.g., “What color was the 
gun?”) and whether feedback affected participant source monitoring ability. To examine 
whether feedback impacted source monitoring accuracy, a one-way MANOVA was 
conducted. The independent variable was the type of feedback given to participants and 
the dependent variables were the rates of correct source identification, incorrect source 
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identification, and “don’t know” source identification responses. A one-way MANOVA 
revealed no significant impact of feedback on source identification accuracy, F(3, 155) = 
.970, p = .528, η2p = .003. 
Table 7 
Source monitoring accuracy, inaccuracy, and don’t know response rates 
 Source Identification Rate 
 Accurate Inaccurate Don’t Know 
Feedback Received M SD M SD M SD 
Confirming 0.67 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.10 0.29 
Neutral 0.59 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.11 0.30 
None 0.64 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.11 0.11 
Disconfirming 0.61 0.33 0.23 0.27 0.16 0.23 
 
 Confidence in source monitoring accuracy. To assess the impact of feedback on 
self-reported confidence in source identification accuracy, a one-way ANOVA was used. 
The independent variable was the type of feedback given to participants and the 
dependent variable was confidence in the accuracy of source identification. The analysis 
revealed that feedback had a significant impact on participant confidence in their source 
identification accuracy, F(3, 155) = 3.90, p = .02. Subsequent Tukey tests revealed that 
participants given confirming feedback were significantly more confident in the source 
identification accuracy compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p = .02). 
There were no other significant effects of feedback on source monitoring recall accuracy 
(see Table 8 for confidence ratings in source identification accuracy).  
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Table 8 
Confidence ratings in source monitoring accuracy (1 = not at all confidence and 7 = 
extremely confident)  
 Confidence Rating 
 Accurate Inaccurate 
Feedback Received M SD M SD 
Confirming 5.67* 1.12 5.51* 1.21 
Neutral 4.94 1.90 4.55 1.32 
None 4.85 2.10 4.66 1.87 
Disconfirming 4.04 1.51 4.30 2.00 
*Denotes significant difference at p < .05 
Relationship between source identification accuracy and confidence. Next, a 
Pearson correlation examined a possible relationship between source identification 
accuracy and confidence in source identification accuracy. There was no significant 
correlation between source identification accuracy and confidence in source identification 
accuracy, r = 0.19, n = 158, p = .209.  
Rapport Questionnaire 
To examine the effects of feedback (confirming vs. disconfirming vs. neutral vs. 
no feedback) on participants’ perceptions of rapport with the interviewer, a one-way 
MANOVA was conducted and revealed a statistically significant effect of feedback on 
rapport, F(63, 347) = 1.51, p = .012, η2p = .214. Follow-up analyses revealed that 
feedback had a statistically significant effect on the perceived friendliness of the 
experimenter, F(3, 155) = 3.34, p = .021, η2p = .069. Specifically, post hoc Tukey tests 
demonstrated that participants given confirming feedback perceived the experimenter as 
being significantly more friendly compared to participants who participants given 
disconfirming feedback (p = .036) and participants who received neutral feedback 
perceived the experimenter as being significantly more friendly compared to participants 
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given disconfirming feedback (p = .045). There were no other significant effects of 
feedback on perceptions of experimenter friendliness.  
Feedback also had a statistically significant effect on the perceived positivity of 
the experimenter, F(3, 155) = 2.87, p = .039, η2p = .060. A post hoc Tukey analysis 
revealed that participants given confirming feedback perceived the experimenter to be 
significantly more positive compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p = 
.024). There were no other statistically significant effects of feedback on how positive 
participants perceived the experimenter to be. 
Further analyses revealed that feedback had a statistically significant effect on 
how boring participants perceived the experimenter to be, F(3, 155) = 3.49, p = .017, η2p 
= .072. Post hoc Tukey analyses showed that participants given confirming feedback 
perceived the experimenter to be significantly less boring compared to participants given 
disconfirming feedback (p = .016). There were no other statistically significant effects of 
feedback on how boring participants perceived the experimenter to be. 
Feedback also had a significant effect on how cold participants perceived the 
experimenter to be, F(3, 155) = 3.13, p = .028, η2p = .065. A post hoc Tukey test revealed 
that participants given confirming feedback perceived the experimenter to be 
significantly less cold compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p = .021). 
There were no other statistically significant effects of feedback on how cold participants 
perceived the experimenter to be. 
Further, feedback had a statistically significant effect on how awkward 
participants perceived the experimenter to be, F(3, 155) = 5.22, p = .002, η2p = .103. 
Follow up Tukey tests revealed that participants given confirming feedback perceived the 
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experimenter to be significantly less awkward compared to participants given 
disconfirming feedback (p = .001) and participants given no feedback perceived the 
experimenter to be significantly less awkward compared to participants given 
disconfirming feedback (p = .028). There were no other statistically significant effects of 
feedback on how awkward participants perceived the experimenter to be (see Table 9 for 
rapport interaction ratings of interviewer by feedback condition). 
Table 9 
Rapport interaction ratings of interviewer by feedback condition 
*Denotes significant effect at p < .05 
 
Cognitive Load 
 A one-way MANOVA examined the effects of feedback (confirming vs. 
disconfirming vs. neutral vs. no feedback) on participants’ perceptions of cognitive load. 
 Feedback Received 
 Confirming Neutral None Disconfirming 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Smooth 5.93 1.17 6.22 0.92 5.90 0.87 6.03 1.04 
Satisfied 5.77 1.34 5.49 1.45 5.42 1.09 5.07 1.46 
Engaged 6.25 0.94 6.08 1.21 6.10 1.01 5.86 1.04 
Involved 6.09 1.20 6.05 1.17 6.06 1.12 6.00 1.02 
Friendly 6.59* 0.82 6.59* 1.09 6.16 1.34 5.82 1.49 
Active 6.23 1.27 6.00 1.27 5.84 1.32 6.14 0.93 
Positive 6.39* 1.04 6.19 1.27 6.06 1.09 5.54 1.53 
Likable 6.59 0.82 6.30 1.15 6.16 0.97 5.96 1.07 
Trustworthy 5.86 1.61 6.11 1.26 5.97 1.17 5.57 1.26 
Credible 6.02 1.25 6.08 0.92 6.03 1.08 5.50 1.55 
Boring 1.36* 0.69 1.97 1.46 1.68 1.11 2.25 1.58 
Cooperative 6.34 1.01 6.11 1.22 6.10 1.00 5.79 1.60 
Harmonious 5.86 1.52 6.05 1.00 5.68 1.05 5.46 1.43 
Unsatisfying 4.73 2.39 4.46 2.41 5.26 1.71 4.46 2.01 
Cold 1.34* 0.96 1.70 1.39 1.94 1.29 2.25 1.55 
Awkward 1.36 0.75 1.68 1.00 1.58 1.03 2.36 1.50 
Engaging 6.16* 1.10 6.14 0.95 6.03* 1.02 5.68 1.19 
Unfocused 4.93 2.51 4.68 2.45 5.10 2.20 5.21 2.08 
Involving 6.16 1.24 6.11 0.91 5.94 1.34 5.64 1.28 
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Specifically, how much participants felt they were being evaluated by the experimenter, 
how thoroughly participants were able to search through their memory, how much 
participants were thinking about other things throughout the course of the study, the level 
of mental effort expended during recall, and how difficult it was for participants to 
thoroughly search their memory during recall. A MANOVA revealed a statistically 
significant overall effect of feedback, F(3, 155) = 2.59, p < .001, η2p = .084. 
Follow-up analyses revealed that feedback had a statistically significant effect on 
how thoroughly participants thought they were able to search through their memory, F(3, 
155) = 7.25, p < .001, η2p = .131. Post hoc Tukey tests showed that participants given 
confirming feedback reported being significantly better able to search their memory 
compared to participants given disconfirming feedback (p < .001). There were no other 
statistically significant effects of feedback on how thoroughly participants reported being 
able to search through their memory. 
 Further analyses revealed a statistically significant effect of feedback on and how 
difficult it was for participants to search their memory, F(3, 155) = 8.57, p < .001, η2p = 
.152. Follow up Tukey tests revealed that participants given confirming feedback 
reported significantly less difficulty searching their memory compared to participants 
given neutral feedback (p = .033), participants given no feedback (p = .017), and 
participants given disconfirming feedback, (p < .001). There were no other statistically 
significant effects of feedback on how difficult it reportedly was for participants to search 
their memory. Lastly, there were no other statistically significant effects of feedback on 
measures of reported cognitive load (see Table 10 for mean ratings for measures of 
perceived cognitive load). 
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Table 10 
Mean ratings for measures of perceived cognitive load 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant Suspicion 
 
 Examining participant suspicion, a series of descriptive analyses revealed that one 
participant correctly identified the purpose of the study, 55 participants (34.8%) believed 
the experimenter watched the video before the study, 59 participants (37.3%) generally 
believed that there was deception involved in the study, and 58 participants (36.7%) did 
not believe the experimenter when s/he said the video camera malfunctioned.  
Cognitive Load 
Evaluation Feedback Received Mean SD 
Interviewer 
Evaluating You 
Confirming 4.40 1.67 
Neutral 4.51 1.95 
None 4.48 1.85 
Disconfirming 5.00 2.16 
    
Thorough Search 
of Memory 
Confirming 5.73* 0.89 
Neutral 5.14 0.98 
None 5.23 1.17 
Disconfirming 4.55 1.39 
    
Thinking About 
Other Things 
Confirming 2.93 1.86 
Neutral 2.89 1.74 
None 2.80 1.49 
Disconfirming 2.89 1.73 
    
Mental Effort 
Expended 
Confirming 5.31 1.52 
Neutral 5.84 0.93 
None 5.14 1.46 
Disconfirming 5.39 1.26 
    
Difficulty 
Searching Memory 
Confirming 3.16* 1.45 
Neutral 4.08 1.48 
None 4.17 1.60 
Disconfirming 4.90 1.54 
*Denotes significant effect at p < .05 
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To examine the impact of participant suspicion, all previously described analyses 
were run again after eliminating suspicious participants. There were no differences in 
results between analyses with or without suspicious participants.  In other words, 
participant suspicion did not alter participants’ response patterns as a function of 
feedback or question type.  
Experimenter Effects and Version Effects 
 There were three experimenters who collected data throughout the course of the 
current study. When the variable of the experimenter was added as a covariate in the 
primary analyses for Interview 1, there was no significant effect of experimenter on 
witness accuracy, F(2, 156) = 0.79, p = .287, η2p = .024, or quantity F(2, 156) = 1.83, p = 
.310, η2p = .030, and the main pattern of the results did not differ as a function of the 
experimenter. Furthermore, when the variable of experimenter was added as a covariate 
in the primary analyses for Interview 2, there was no significant effect of experimenter on 
witness accuracy, F(2, 156) = 0.80, p = .092, η2p = .002, or quantity, F(2, 156) = 1.42, p = 
.098, η2p = .022, and the main trends in results did not differ as a function of the 
experimenter. 
 There were three version of the interview question order and three versions of the 
source monitoring questionnaire order, all containing the same questions but in different, 
randomized orders. When interview question order was added as a covariate in the 
primary analysis for Interview 1, there was no significant effect of question order on 
witness accuracy, F(2, 156) = 0.89, p = .201, η2p = .003, or quantity, F(2, 156) = 1.90, p = 
.143, η2p = .008. Further, when interview question order was added as a covariate in the 
primary analysis for Interview 2, there again was no significant effect of question order 
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on witness accuracy, F(2, 156) = 0.71, p = .230, η2p = .001, or quantity, F(2, 156) = 0.58, 
p = .123, η2p = .000. Lastly, when the variable of question order was added as a covariate 
in the primary analysis for source monitoring, there was no significant effect of question 
order on source monitoring accuracy, F(2, 156) = 0.18, p = .301, η2p = .008, or 
confidence, F(2, 156) = 1.00, p = .909, η2p = .012, and the main pattern of results did not 
differ as a result of question order. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
The current study sought to advance our understanding of the effects of post-
recall feedback and question type on eyewitness recall and self-reports of confidence. 
Post-identification feedback has received a plethora of research and some policy attention 
over the past decade, but the effects of post-recall feedback have been largely neglected 
despite the fact that witnesses and victims are arguably interviewed repeatedly during any 
given investigation. To address this gap in the literature, the current study had four main 
goals. 
The first goal was to examine potential effect(s) of different types of feedback, 
namely confirming, disconfirming, neutral, or no post-recall feedback, on subsequent 
eyewitness recall, confidence, and reports of view of the crime. Examining the impact of 
feedback was accomplished by asking participants to view a mock crime video, 
conducting an interview including open-ended and cued questions, giving participants 
either confirming, neutral, no, or disconfirming feedback about their recalled information, 
gathering self-reported confidence and reports of view of the perpetrator, conducting a 
second interview, and reassessing confidence and reports of view of the perpetrator.  
Results revealed no impact of post-recall feedback on recall quantity or accuracy. 
That is, during Interview 2, participant recall did not differ as a function of the type of 
feedback that was given. The lack of a predicted effect may have been due to feedback’s 
selective effect of metacognition and not episodic memory. That is, receiving information 
about the quality of one’s prior recall may not alter a subsequent retrieval attempt but the 
retrospective assessment of a prior attempt only.  
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Results also revealed that participants who received confirming feedback were 
significantly more confident compared to participants given neutral and no feedback and 
those who had disconfirming feedback had significantly lower confidence compared to 
those who received confirming, neutral, or no feedback. Further, disconfirming feedback 
appeared to lower mock witness confidence compared to those participants who were 
given neutral and no feedback.  
The detrimental effect of disconfirming feedback on confidence is especially 
noteworthy given the SCIF’s prediction that disconfirming feedback should not have a 
detrimental effect on confidence given that witnesses are predicted to disregard external 
cues that are not confirming (Charman et al., 2010). In contrast to the prediction of the 
SCIF, the data in the current study suggest that at least in witness recall settings, 
disconfirming feedback may lead to a substantial decrease in confidence compared to no 
or neutral feedback.  
Although the SCIF suggests that witnesses disregard non-confirming cues, some 
research on post-identification feedback does suggest that disconfirming feedback can  
negatively affect witness confidence (Douglas & Steblay, 2006; Steblay et al., 2014; 
Wells & Bradfield, 1998), even if disconfirming feedback is less impactful than the 
effects of confirming feedback on identification confidence (Douglas & Steblay, 2006). 
One possible explanation for the substantial impact of disconfirming post-recall feedback 
on participant confidence in the current study may be the result of one major difference 
between a lineup identification and recalling a critical event via an investigative 
interview: the number of informational units offered.   
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During a lineup identification, witnesses are generally only offering the identity of 
who they believe to be the perpetrator. However, during the recall of a critical event, 
participants are likely offering a plethora of informational units (e.g., details about the 
perpetrator, other witnesses, the setting, etc.). It is thus possible that providing witnesses 
with disconfirming feedback about the overall accuracy of an entire recall led to a 
generalization of said feedback across all informational unit and, in turn, substantially 
reduced confidence in overall recall. Further, as Wells and Bradford (1998) note, the 
impact of post-identification feedback will likely differ greatly depending upon the way 
in which that feedback is operationalized. As such, it may have been the general way in 
which feedback was offered in this study (“Although I haven’t watched the video, I’ve 
been given information about the video from the experimenters in charge of the study and 
the information you’ve given me seems to be inaccurate.”) that impacted participant 
confidence. 
As to whether the relationship between confidence and accuracy was moderated 
by feedback, the data show no correlation between confidence and accuracy in any 
feedback condition. That is, the first and second assessments of participant confidence 
and perception of recall accuracy were neither related to the actual accuracy of recall for 
Interview 1 nor for Interview 2, respectively. The finding of no significant correlation 
between confidence and accuracy is in line with previous eyewitness identification 
research which suggests that confidence in a lineup selection is not always a reliable 
predictor of accuracy (Brewer, Keast, & Rishworth, 2002). However, given the 
potentially intricate relationship between confidence and accuracy (Sporer et al., 1995), 
future research will be needed to examine whether the relationship between confidence 
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and accuracy may be moderated by the type of task participants are asked to perform 
(e.g., recall vs. identification). 
The second goal of the current study was to examine the effects of different types 
of feedback on witnesses’ subsequent suggestibility to misinformation. Recall that 
participants were asked suggestive questions after they had been given feedback. 
Contrary to predictions, participants’ vulnerability to suggestion did not vary as a 
function of feedback.  
There are a variety of ways to test for witness suggestibility in experimental 
paradigms, such as the misinformation paradigm, suggestive questions or the DRM 
paradigm (Pezdek & Lam, 2007). As such, the size and nature of a suggestibility effect in 
various settings can depend on the way it is operationalized. In the present study, we 
tested for witness suggestibility using suggestive questions, half of which were correct, 
others incorrect. Whereas the post-recall feedback was of a general nature, each 
suggestive question targeted one specific to-be-remembered item. It is thus possible that 
general feedback does not affect subsequent vulnerability to suggestion for specific 
details.  
The third goal was to examine possible interactions between post-recall feedback 
and question format on witness recall, confidence, and reports of view of a crime. As 
predicted, open-ended questions elicited a higher quantity and accuracy of information 
compared to cued questions during both Interview 1 and Interview 2. The finding that 
open-ended interview questions are more beneficial compared to cued questions is 
consistent with a long line of research findings documenting and encouraging the use of 
free narratives via suggesting that open-ended questions allow participants to carefully 
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monitor their own knowledge and determine their own output criteria (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Powell, Fisher, & Wright, 2005).  
The final goal of the current research was to assess the impact of feedback on the 
accuracy of witness source monitoring. Data revealed that the type of feedback given to 
witnesses did not significantly affect subsequent source monitoring abilities. Past 
research has documented that source monitoring processes can be impaired via a variety 
of external factors (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson et al., 1995). However, in the 
current study, feedback did not appear to affect mechanisms that bolster or enhance 
source monitoring abilities. 
An important piece to the puzzle of post-recall feedback was provided by the 
finding that those participants who were given confirming feedback rated the interviewer 
higher on measures of rapport compared to participants given neutral, no, and 
disconfirming feedback. Specifically, participants given confirming feedback perceived 
the experimenter as being significantly more friendly and positive compared to 
participants given disconfirming feedback. Further, participants given neutral feedback 
also perceived the experimenter as being significantly friendlier compared to participants 
given disconfirming feedback. Some research has found rapport to be beneficial to 
participant recall (Collins et al., 2002; Kieckhaefer et al., 2014; Vallano & Schreiber 
Compo, 2011).  
To the extent that disconfirming feedback is perceived as negative interviewing 
behavior and interviewer rapport, it may thus affect witnesses’ post hoc metacognitive 
assessment of their prior recall – that is, their confidence in the previously provided 
statement. However, considering that there was no impact of feedback on accuracy or 
72 
 
quantity of information recalled, feedback may only have an indirect effect on 
interviewer rapport. Rather, participants may have simply perceived experimenters giving 
confirming feedback as generally being more friendly and positive because they validated 
their memory skills and/or effort, while they viewed experimenters giving disconfirming 
feedback as being cold and awkward for doing the opposite. 
Lastly, findings of perceived cognitive load were affected by the type of feedback 
given to participants. Participants given confirming feedback tended to perceive their 
cognitive load as being significantly lower compared to participants given disconfirming 
feedback. Specifically, participants who received confirming feedback reported being 
significantly more able to thoroughly search their memory compared to participants who 
received disconfirming feedback. Further, participants who received confirming feedback 
reported having significantly less difficulty searching through their memory compared to 
participants given neutral, no, and disconfirming feedback.  
It is important to point out however, that there was no direct impact of feedback 
on witness recall quantity or accuracy suggesting that the effect of feedback on cognitive 
load was limited at best. Further, the current study asked participants about perceived 
cognitive load rather than using an objective measure of cognitive load (e.g., by having 
participants complete a secondary, cognitively demanding task). Also, as people are 
largely unable to accurately assess their underlying and non-conscious cognitive 
processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002), asking participants about their 
perception of cognitive load may not have been an accurate measure of cognitive load. 
As such, it may have been that because participants given confirming feedback were told 
their recall was accurate, they concluded that they must have been able to search through 
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their memory, whereas participants given disconfirming feedback may have concluded 
they must not have been able to thoroughly search their memory. 
Practical and Theoretical Implications 
 
The current research aimed at developing a better understanding of whether the 
impact of post-recall feedback parallels findings for the effects of post-identification 
feedback on witness confidence. It further examined the effects of feedback on a new 
outcome measure, namely repeated retrieval. In line with research on lineup 
identifications, data revealed that confirming feedback inflates subsequent witness 
confidence for prior recall, but not for the accuracy of subsequent recall. In contrast to 
predictions of the SCIF (Charman et al., 2010), the current research also showed that 
even disconfirming feedback can affect subsequent witness confidence. The present set of 
findings can help inform and possibly help modify the SCIF to account for the divergence 
between the current results and the outcome predicted by the SCIF.  
Further, findings on the advantages of free recall directly support theories and 
policy recommendations of the use of such technique in enhancing witness recall. The 
present data equally support a long line of research on the advantages of repeated 
retrieval (Fisher & Schreiber, 2007), namely, the opportunity to glean new pieces of 
information about the mock crime from participants after an exhaustive free-recall 
opportunity.  
Data from the current research can inform law enforcement interviewers and the 
legal system of the consequences of offering post-recall feedback. Findings suggest that 
offering confirming feedback inflates subsequent witness confidence and offering 
disconfirming feedback can decrease subsequent witness confidence, but not necessarily 
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accuracy. Thus, interviewers should monitor closely if and what type of feedback has 
been given to a witness after recall noting that no feedback should be given until an 
untainted measure of confidence can be obtained.  
Furthermore, although rapport may only have been partially enhanced via 
feedback in the current study, research-based investigative interviewing guidelines 
encourage interviewers to utilize techniques which will facilitate future communication 
between witnesses and law enforcement practitioners (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; 
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; 2003). The current research 
suggests that even participants given neutral feedback, which did not inflate confidence 
compared to those given confirming feedback, rated the experimenter as being more 
friendly compared to participants given disconfirming feedback. Taken together, it may 
be that law enforcement practitioners can use neutral feedback to help build rapport 
which may lead to enhanced communication between witnesses and law enforcement 
interviewers. 
As a result of the combination of an ecologically valid design with strong 
experimental control, these results may be particularly impactful at the interface of 
research and investigative interviewing practice with the long-term goal of putting 
forward policy recommendations. Because witness confidence and accuracy are two of 
the most crucial factors jurors use to assess credibility, it is important for legal 
psychology researchers and law enforcement and legal professionals to take into 
consideration possible effects of post-identification feedback on subsequent witness 
measures. As such, the results can  help “bridge the gap” between laboratory researchers 
and the law enforcement community as well as legal professionals such as judges and 
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attorneys, especially given that feedback and question type are both system variables and, 
as such, under the control of the legal system.  
Limitations 
 
The current study had several limitations. One limitation was the use of a crime 
video rather than a live crime. Given the ethical constraints, the current study did not 
place participants in a situation where they perceived their physical safety to be in 
jeopardy (e.g., through the use of an in-person armed robbery). Although a live crime 
option would have been a casual or subtle robbery such as the taking of a laptop, these 
scenarios often leave the participant unaware that a crime is even taking place until they 
are informed by an experimenter or confederate associated with the study. Thus, despite 
the fact that the use of a crime video is unlikely to induce the same anxiety and/or stress 
that would come with a staged armed robbery, it arguably parallels similar memory and 
attentional processes. For these reasons, the use of crime videos has been widely accepted 
as an adequately parallel stimulus (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). The primary 
advantage of using a crime video is that presenting each participant with the exact same 
crime minimizes the likelihood that differences between participants are the result of 
variation of the target stimulus. 
A second limitation in the current study was the form of the question asking about 
confidence. The form of the question in the current study (“On a scale of one to seven 
with one being extremely not confident and seven being extremely confident, how 
confident are you that the information you have given me in your statement is accurate?”) 
asked about current confidence rather than confidence at the time of recall. Although 
participant confidence still appeared to be affected by the feedback manipulation, the 
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form of the question may not have elicited a retrospective reflection of confidence. In 
other words, the question in its current form may not have prompted participants to assess 
their confidence at the time of recall and thus did not examine if feedback actually 
changed the memory of confidence at the time of recall. As such, the conclusion cannot 
be drawn from the current data that post-recall feedback distorts recall of how confident 
participants were at the time of recall.  
A third potential issue with the current study is the composition of the sample. 
The sample in the present study was primarily female and Hispanic, with all of the 
participants enrolled in an undergraduate program at the time of participation. While 
gender and ethnicity would not be expected to interact with memory, recall, confidence, 
or source monitoring abilities, attendance at a university may indicate that participants in 
the current study may have differed from the general population in their cognitive and 
attentional skills. Future researcher should thus expand upon current findings with 
increasingly representative samples.  
Future Research 
The use of a live target event may help to provide stimulus generalization and 
investigate whether the findings in the current study hold true for participants witnessing 
a live crime. The use of a live crime would allow researchers to examine the potential 
impact of stress and anxiety of having witnessed a “real” crime. Being interviewed about 
a more authentic crime may also prompt participants to be more accurate or thorough in 
their recall of a target event. The viewing of a live crime may also make the results of 
such a study more representative of real-world procedures and generalizable for law 
enforcement practitioners.  
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Interviewing participants about a more realistic target event would also give 
researchers the opportunity to examine different sources of information as the 
justification for giving feedback. For example, experimenters could tell participants that 
the information which allows them to give feedback (e.g., “The information you gave me 
appears to be accurate.”) came from various sources such as security camera footage, 
other witness accounts, or the confession of a suspect. It may also be valuable to examine 
conflicting sources of feedback. For example, future researchers could present 
participants with information from one source (e.g., an investigator) suggesting the recall 
of the witness is accurate and compare it to the feedback from another, possibly less 
credible source. Future research would also be able to examine whether the present set of 
findings can be replicated. Considering that research on  post-recall feedback is in its 
infancy, it will be critical to not only ensure the impact of post-recall feedback on 
confidence is reliable, but to understand the theoretical underpinnings of why post-recall 
feedback impacts confidence.  
One topic that should be addressed specifically in future research is the 
divergence from what was predicted by the SCIF (Charman et al., 2010). As discussed 
above, the SCIF predicted that disconfirming feedback would have no impact on 
confidence. However, the current study showed that disconfirming feedback had a 
significantly deleterious effect on confidence. One possible explanation for the negative 
impact of disconfirming feedback on confidence is the number of units recalled during an 
investigative interview compared to the typically single unit of information that is given 
during a lineup. As such, future research should examine the potential impact of 
witnesses receiving feedback on single versus multiple pieces of information.  
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Future research should also address any effect of generalized feedback, as was 
used in current study, versus more specific feedback on an individual piece of 
information given during recall. For example, offering feedback on the ethnicity of a 
perpetrator rather than on the entire recall of a participant. Offering disconfirming 
feedback on a single piece of information may yield somewhat counter-intuitive research: 
that disconfirming feedback may actually enhance participant confidence rather than 
diminish it. The reason that disconfirming feedback on a single piece of “incorrect” 
information may actually bolster participant confidence is that participants may believe 
that, if only a single piece of their recall (e.g., race of the perpetrator) was incorrect, the 
feedback on that specific piece may automatically imply that the rest of their recall was 
correct. Believing that only one incorrect detail out of many is incorrect may bolster 
confidence for the remaining pieces of information reported, rather than damaging it. 
Alternatively, disconfirming feedback on a single piece of information may decrease 
confidence if participants believe their inaccurate recall on a single piece of information 
is indicative of the accuracy of other units of information they recalled.  
Another promising direction for future research is to examine the impact of post-
recall feedback on the perception of witnesses who have received feedback. In other 
words, researchers could examine whether there are any differences in the way(s) in 
which witnesses who have been given various types of post-recall feedback are perceived 
by decision makers (i.e., jurors). Smalarz and Wells (2014) have examined the impact of 
post-identification feedback on perceptions of witnesses by neutral observers. 
Specifically, participants made either an accurate or inaccurate lineup identification and 
were then given either confirming feedback (e.g., “Good job! You identified the 
79 
 
suspect.”) or no feedback. These participants then gave videotaped testimony about the 
identification that they made. Next, a second group of participants (evaluators) were 
shown the subsequent testimony from members of the first group of participants with the 
goal of assessing the accuracy of the identification members of the first group made. 
Results revealed that evaluators who were shown video testimony of participants who 
were not given feedback rated participants who made an accurate identification as 
significantly more likely to be accurate compared to participants who were given 
confirming feedback. In other words, results demonstrated that post-identification 
feedback harms the ability of evaluators to correctly judge accurate and mistaken witness 
testimony. 
As an extension of Smalarz and Wells (2014), future researchers should present 
independent evaluators post-feedback interviews to examine whether various types of 
feedback (e.g., confirming, neutral, disconfirming) has any impact on evaluator 
perceptions of believability, accuracy, confidence, and trustworthiness of participants 
after they have been given feedback. Researchers could then compare pre-feedback recall 
and post-feedback recall to explore any potential differences in credibility. 
Lastly, a direction for future research would be to examine the combination of a 
lineup identification, post-recall and/or post-identification feedback, and at least one 
investigative interview. Research examining a combination of these factors would be 
especially important given that witnesses in real world investigations typically encounter 
a lineup identification, at least one investigative interview, and possibly investigator 
feedback throughout the course of an investigation. For example, researchers may 
examine the impact of post-recall feedback (confirming, neutral, none, or disconfirming) 
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followed by a lineup after which post-identification feedback (confirming, neutral, none, 
or disconfirming) is given. It would be important to examine the effects of differing types 
of feedback throughout the course of an investigation as well as feedback on various 
aspects of information offered by witnesses (e.g., investigative interview recall versus 
lineup identification). 
Conclusion 
The number of wrongful conviction cases which involve suboptimal information 
collected from witnesses during lineup identifications or investigative interviews is 
troublesome. As such, it is important for researchers to continue to explore ways in which 
the quantity and accuracy of information offered by witnesses can be maximized. Further, 
it will be critical to assess the ways in which perceived indicators of credibility (i.e., 
confidence) can be knowingly or unknowingly altered by investigators and the ways in 
which the relationship between confidence and accuracy can be moderated so that 
reported confidence in accuracy can closely represent actual accuracy. 
It will also be important for researchers to focus on the variety of ways in which 
the collection of a high quantity of accurate information from witnesses can be 
maximized throughout the course of a criminal investigation. Researchers should not only 
continue to explore and refine the understanding of investigative interviewing techniques 
that have already been established (e.g., best practice interviewing techniques), but 
investigate novel system variables which may impact the quantity and accuracy of 
information gathered by law enforcement practitioners. 
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Appendix A 
The selective cue integration framework* 
 
 
 
*Diagram from Charman, Carlucci, Vallano, & Hyman Gregory (2010), p. 206 
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Appendix B 
Still shot of mock crime video  
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Appendix C 
Number connection distractor puzzle 
 
Please connect only the odd numbered boxes below going from highest (starting at 31) to 
lowest (ending at 1). Once you have finished with this page, move on to the next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
2 
3 
4
5 
6 
7
8
9
10
11 
12 
13
14
15
16 
17 
18 
19
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 26 
27
28
29 
30
31
32 
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Appendix D 
Open-ended question script 
 
“I am now going to ask you some questions about what you saw on the DVD. Because I 
have never seen the DVD you just watched, I am required to read you the following 
questions.” 
 
1) “Tell me everything that you can remember about what you just witnessed.”  
2) “Tell me everything you can remember about the perpetrator.” 
3) “Tell me everything you can remember about any witnesses.” 
4) “Tell me everything you can remember about the location of the crime.”  
5) “Is there anything else you can remember?” [This question was repeated until the 
participant explicitly stated that he or she could not remember anything else.]   
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Appendix E 
Cued question script 
 
1) INT: What color were the frames of the glasses the cashier was wearing? 
2) INT: What was the race of the perpetrator? 
3) INT: What did the perpetrator put in his pocket? 
4) INT: What was the first thing the perpetrator touched in the store? 
5) INT: What was the color of the sign displaying the store’s hours? 
6) INT: What was the male customer holding when the robbery began? 
7) INT: What was the color of the shirt underneath the perpetrator’s sweatshirt? 
8) INT: What color was the male customer’s shirt? 
9) INT: How was the female customer’s hair styled? 
10) INT: What was the first thing the perpetrator asked for? 
11) INT: What words were displayed above the case the perpetrator took something out 
of? 
12) INT: What, if any, accessory was the female customer wearing? 
13) INT: What hours was the store open on Saturday? 
14) INT: What was the male customer wearing on his feet? 
15) INT: How many lights were visible directly above the cashier’s head? 
16) INT: From your point of view, what door did the perpetrator use to enter the store? 
17) INT: What color was the female customer’s shirt? 
18) INT: How many people were in the convenience store at the time of the robbery? 
19) INT: Is there anything else you can remember? [This question was repeated until the 
participant explicitly stated that he or she could not remember anything else.]   
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Appendix F 
Self-reported measures questionnaire 
 
Length of View 
 
“What is the length of time you viewed the perpetrator in seconds?” 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Quality of View 
“On a scale of one to seven with one being extremely poor and seven being extremely 
clear, how would you rate your view of the perpetrator?” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely  
poor 
     Extremely 
clear 
 
 
Attention 
“On a scale of one to seven with one being extremely low and seven being extremely  
high, how would you rate the level of attention that you paid to the perpetrator?” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely  
low 
     Extremely 
high 
 
 
Confidence 
“On a scale of one to seven with one being extremely not confident and seven being 
extremely confident, how confident are you that the information you gave me during the 
interview was accurate?”  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely not 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 
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Ease of Recall 
“On a scale of one to seven with one being not at all easy and seven being extremely 
easy, how easy was it for you to recall the information you gave me during the 
interview?” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all  
easy 
     Extremely 
easy 
 
 
Perception of Accuracy 
 
“On a scale of one to seven with one being extremely inaccurate and seven being 
extremely accurate, how accurate was the information you gave me during the 
interview?” 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely 
inaccurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 
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Appendix G 
Scale sheet given to participants when asked to rate confidence, quality of view of the 
perpetrator, ease of recall, and perception of accuracy 
 
SCALE 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix H 
Suggestive question script  
 
Accurate/Inaccurate Suggestive Questions 
½ correct, ½ incorrect suggestive questions (correct/incorrect) 
 
“Now I’m going to ask you a series of more specific questions about the incident that I 
am going to read.” 
 
1. Was the gun black/silver? 
2. Was the robber wearing sneakers/boots? 
3. Was the robber wearing jeans/shorts? 
4. Was the robber’s sweatshirt black/grey? 
5. Was the cashier holding a cell phone/pen? 
6. Was the female customer carrying a dog/cat? 
7. Did the robber hold the gun in his right/left hand? 
8. Were there 2/Was there 1 door in the convenience store? 
9. Did the perpetrator pick up a drink/chips while in the store? 
10. Were there 3/2 people in the convenience store at the time of the robbery? 
11. Did the robber have any facial hair/Was the robber clean shaven? 
12. Was the female customer’s shirt blue/green? 
13. Was the female customer wearing a purse/necklace? 
14. Was the female customer’s hair pulled back in a ponytail/down and behind her 
shoulders? 
15. Was the male witness’s shirt brown/black? 
16. Did the male witness have any facial hair/Was the male witness clean shaven? 
17. Was the convenience store called Wink’s/Val’s quick stop? 
18. Did the robber pull the gun out from behind his back/from his front sweatshirt 
pocket? 
19. Was the item the female customer bought green/yellow? 
20. Was the shirt the robber was wearing underneath his sweatshirt green/blue? 
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Appendix I 
Source monitoring questionnaire 
 
Directions: You will now be asked to answer a set of questions. If you do not know the answer to 
a question, please write “I don’t know” on the line pertaining to the question For each answer, 
you will then be asked to report where you remember learning that information (the source of that 
information) and then rate your confidence that the information you reported is correct.  After you 
have responded to each question, please indicate whether you saw or heard the information: (a) 
“from the interviewer only,” (b) “from the video only,” (c) “from the interviewer and video” or 
(d) “Don’t know.”   
 
1. What color was the gun?  
 
         __________________________________________________ 
  
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c. From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
2. What was the robber wearing on his feet? 
 
         __________________________________________________ 
  
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
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How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
3. What bottoms was the robber wearing?  
 
                  ___________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.    From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
4. What color was the robber’s sweatshirt? 
 
                 ____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
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5. What was the cashier holding in her hand?  
 
 ____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
6. What animal was the female customer carrying? 
 
                  _____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a.   From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
7. Which hand did the robber hold the gun in? 
 
                   ____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
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 Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
8. How many doors were there at the entrance of the convenience store?  
 
                  _____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
9. What item did the robber pick up while shopping?  
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
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How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
10. How many people were in the convenience store at the time of the robbery?  
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
11. Did the robber have any facial hair?  
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
   
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
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12.  What color was the female customer’s shirt? 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer  b.   From the video 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
13. What if any accessory was the female customer wearing? 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
14. How was the female customer’s hair styled?  
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
104 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
15. What color was the male witness’s shirt? 
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
16. Did the male witness have any facial hair?  
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
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17.        What was the name of the convenience store?  
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
 
18.          Where did the robber keep the gun?  
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
 
How confident are you that you accurately remember the source of the information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
19.           What color was the item that the female customer purchased?  
 
____________________________________________________ 
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How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
 
How confident are you that you correctly remember this information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
20.        What color was the robber’s shirt that he wore underneath his sweatshirt?  
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your response? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
 
Where do you remember encountering this information? 
 
a. From the interviewer only  b.   From the video only 
c.   From the interviewer and video d.   Don’t know 
How confident are you that you correctly remember this information? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Extremely 
confident 
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Appendix J 
Rapport questionnaire 
 
Directions: Rate the experimenter (who interviewed you today) on the following 
characteristics 
 
   Smooth             1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
    Not smooth                  Somewhat smooth                  Extremely smooth               
                        
  
  Satisfied          1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
    Not satisfied                 Somewhat satisfied              Extremely satisfied 
 
    
Engaged          1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
    Not engaged               Somewhat engaged                Extremely engaged 
 
   
 Involved          1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
    Not involved                Somewhat involved             Extremely involved 
 
  
  Friendly           1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
    Not friendly                 Somewhat friendly               Extremely friendly 
 
   
 Active              1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
    Not active                    Somewhat active                     Extremely active 
 
    
Positive            1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
   Not positive                  Somewhat positive               Extremely positive 
 
    
Likeable           1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
   Not likeable                   Somewhat likeable              Extremely likeable 
 
    
Credible          1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
   Not credible                    Somewhat credible               Extremely credible 
 
     
Boring             1               2               3               4               5               6            7 
       Not boring                  Somewhat boring                   Extremely boring 
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Cooperative     1               2               3               4               5               6            7 
       Not cooperative          Somewhat cooperative      Extremely cooperative 
 
    
Harmonious     1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
       Not harmonious         Somewhat harmonious      Extremely harmonious 
 
 
Unsatisfying    1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
              Unsatisfying                     Satisfying                 Extremely satisfying 
 
    
 Cold                1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
              Not cold                       Somewhat cold                    Extremely cold 
 
     
Awkward        1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
             Not awkward            Somewhat awkward          Extremely awkward 
 
     
Engaging        1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
              Not engaging           Somewhat engaging          Extremely engaging 
 
     
Unfocused      1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
              Not focused                         Focused                   Extremely focused 
 
    
 Involving        1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
              Not involving           Somewhat involving        Extremely involving 
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Appendix K 
Cognitive load questionnaire 
1. When interviewed about the crime today, how much did you think about if the 
interviewer was evaluating you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all       A lot 
 
2. When interviewed about the crime today, how thoroughly were you able to search 
through your memory? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all       Very thoroughly 
 
3. When interviewed about the crime today, how much were you thinking about 
other things besides the crime? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all       A lot 
 
4. If you were thinking/focusing on other things while you were remembering the 
crime, please describe those.  
 
 
 
 
5. When remembering the crime today, how much mental effort did you use/spend 
on providing accurate and plentiful information? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very low  
mental effort 
     Very high 
mental effort 
 
6. When remembering the crime today, how difficult was it to thoroughly search 
your memory? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
difficult 
     Extremely 
difficult 
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Appendix L 
Participant suspicion questionnaire 
 
1.  What do you believe was the purpose of this study? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Do you believe the experimenter saw the video prior to this study?  Please circle one. 
Yes    No 
 
3. Do you believe deception was involved in this study? 
 
Yes    No 
 
3a. If you answered “yes” please explain. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Did you believe the experimenter when he/she said that the first video did not record? 
 
    Yes    No 
 
4a. Why or why not? 
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Appendix M 
Procedure 
 
Step 1 Mock crime video 
 
 
 
Step 2 Distractor task 
 
 
 
Step 3 Interview 1 
(open-ended and cued questions) 
 
 
 
Step 4 Feedback 
(confirming v. neutral v. none v. disconfirming) 
 
 
 
Step 5 Confidence and reports of view ratings 
 
 
 
Step 6 Interview 2 
(open-ended, cued, and suggestive questions) 
 
 
 
Step 7 Confidence and reports of view ratings 
 
 
 
Step 8 Source monitoring questionnaire 
 
 
 
Step 9 Rapport, cognitive load, and suspicion questionnaires 
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